linux-kernel - [PATCH 5.13 059/380] f2fs: fix to do sanity check for sb/cp fields correctly

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Message-Id: <20210916155806.000389543@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Thu, 16 Sep 2021 17:56:56 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, stable@...nel.org,
        Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>, Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.13 059/380] f2fs: fix to do sanity check for sb/cp fields correctly

From: Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>

commit 65ddf6564843890a58ee3b18bb46ce67d96333fb upstream.

This patch fixes below problems of sb/cp sanity check:
- in sanity_check_raw_superi(), it missed to consider log header
blocks while cp_payload check.
- in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(), it missed to check nat_bits_blocks.

Cc: <stable@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/super.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -3089,11 +3089,13 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
-	if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload) >
-				(blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS)) {
-		f2fs_info(sbi, "Insane cp_payload (%u > %u)",
+	if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload) >=
+				(blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
+				NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE)) {
+		f2fs_info(sbi, "Insane cp_payload (%u >= %u)",
 			  le32_to_cpu(raw_super->cp_payload),
-			  blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS);
+			  blocks_per_seg - F2FS_CP_PACKS -
+			  NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE);
 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
 	}
 
@@ -3129,6 +3131,7 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_s
 	unsigned int cp_pack_start_sum, cp_payload;
 	block_t user_block_count, valid_user_blocks;
 	block_t avail_node_count, valid_node_count;
+	unsigned int nat_blocks, nat_bits_bytes, nat_bits_blocks;
 	int i, j;
 
 	total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
@@ -3249,6 +3252,17 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_s
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	nat_blocks = nat_segs << log_blocks_per_seg;
+	nat_bits_bytes = nat_blocks / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	nat_bits_blocks = F2FS_BLK_ALIGN((nat_bits_bytes << 1) + 8);
+	if (__is_set_ckpt_flags(ckpt, CP_NAT_BITS_FLAG) &&
+		(cp_payload + F2FS_CP_PACKS +
+		NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE + nat_bits_blocks >= blocks_per_seg)) {
+		f2fs_warn(sbi, "Insane cp_payload: %u, nat_bits_blocks: %u)",
+			  cp_payload, nat_bits_blocks);
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	}
+
 	if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
 		f2fs_err(sbi, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
 		return 1;