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Message-ID: <9312a767-f1d3-d283-80a9-e6b3854252e1@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Sep 2021 09:10:49 +0800
From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 01/41] x86/entry: Fix swapgs fence
On 2021/9/27 04:43, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> Lai,
>
> On Sun, Sep 26 2021 at 23:07, Lai Jiangshan wrote:
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -898,17 +898,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
>> rdmsr
>> testl %edx, %edx
>> jns .Lparanoid_entry_swapgs
>> + FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
>
> Good catch.
>
>> ret
>>
>> .Lparanoid_entry_swapgs:
>> swapgs
>> -
>> - /*
>> - * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
>> - * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case. So do an lfence
>> - * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
>> - */
>> - FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
>> + FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
>
> This change is wrong.
>
> In the paranoid entry path even if user GS base is set then the entry
> does not necessarily come from user space so there is no guarantee that
> there was a CR3 write on PTI enabled systems before the SWAPGS.
>
> FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY does not emit a LFENCE when PTI is enabled, so
> both the comment and FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY which emits LFENCE on
> affected CPUs unconditionaly are correct. Though the comment could do
> with some polishing to make this entirely clear.
I didn't notice FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY depends on PTI.
I will add FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY only on the kernel path.
Thanks
Lai
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