| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <20210928191009.32551-7-bp@alien8.de>
Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2021 21:10:07 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel@...ll.ch>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
David Airlie <airlied@...ux.ie>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
"Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@...ux.intel.com>,
Maxime Ripard <mripard@...nel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@...e.de>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
VMware Graphics <linux-graphics-maintainer@...are.com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org,
amd-gfx@...ts.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@...ts.freedesktop.org,
kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with cc_platform_has()
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Replace uses of sev_active() with the more generic cc_platform_has()
using CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT. If future support is added for other
memory encryption technologies, the use of CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT
can be updated, as required.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 --
arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 21 ++++++++-------------
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++++----
9 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 63c5b99ccae5..a5a58ccd1ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
-bool sev_active(void);
bool sev_es_active(void);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { }
-static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; }
static inline bool sev_es_active(void) { return false; }
static inline int __init
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
index 045e82e8945b..a7f617a3981d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
static ssize_t __copy_oldmem_page(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
unsigned long offset, int userbuf,
@@ -73,5 +74,6 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize,
ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
{
- return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active());
+ return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0,
+ cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index b656456c3a94..8863d1941f1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/swait.h>
#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <asm/timer.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
@@ -418,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void)
{
int cpu;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
index ad273e5861c1..fc3930c5db1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c
@@ -16,9 +16,9 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
-#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <asm/x86_init.h>
#include <asm/kvmclock.h>
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void __init kvmclock_init_mem(void)
* hvclock is shared between the guest and the hypervisor, must
* be mapped decrypted.
*/
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
r = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) hvclock_mem,
1UL << order);
if (r) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 7040c0fa921c..f5da4a18070a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
clear_page(level4p);
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
info.page_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 05e8d4d27969..a2f78a8cfdaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
return 0;
}
- if (sev_active()) {
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index a7250fa3d45f..b59a5cbc6bc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_ram(struct resource *res)
*/
static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return 0;
switch (res->desc) {
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res)
*/
static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desc)
{
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
case E820_TYPE_NVS:
case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
/* For SEV, these areas are encrypted */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
break;
fallthrough;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 2163485a74e1..932007a6913b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
swiotlb_force = SWIOTLB_FORCE;
}
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void __init sev_setup_arch(void)
phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
unsigned long size;
- if (!sev_active())
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return;
/*
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
/*
* SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are
* times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
- * sme_active() and sev_active() functions are used for this. When a
- * distinction isn't needed, the mem_encrypt_active() function can be used.
+ * cc_platform_has() function is used for this. When a distinction isn't
+ * needed, the CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT attribute can be used.
*
* The trampoline code is a good example for this requirement. Before
* paging is activated, SME will access all memory as decrypted, but SEV
@@ -373,11 +373,6 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
* the trampoline area must be encrypted.
*/
-bool sev_active(void)
-{
- return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);
/* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
@@ -391,7 +386,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
/*
* For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
*/
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
return true;
/*
@@ -450,7 +445,7 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
}
/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pr_cont(" SEV");
/* Encrypted Register State */
@@ -473,7 +468,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
* With SEV, we need to unroll the rep string I/O instructions,
* but SEV-ES supports them through the #VC handler.
*/
- if (sev_active() && !sev_es_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && !sev_es_active())
static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key);
print_mem_encrypt_feature_info();
@@ -481,6 +476,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
int arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
{
- return sev_active();
+ return cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_has_restricted_virtio_memory_access);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 7515e78ef898..1f3675453a57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/ucs2_string.h>
-#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void __init __map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md, u64 va)
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB))
flags |= _PAGE_PCD;
- if (sev_active() && md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) &&
+ md->type != EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
flags |= _PAGE_ENC;
pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ static int __init efi_update_mem_attr(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *m
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
return efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
@@ -438,7 +439,7 @@ void __init efi_runtime_update_mappings(void)
(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE))
pf |= _PAGE_RW;
- if (sev_active())
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
pf |= _PAGE_ENC;
efi_update_mappings(md, pf);
--
2.29.2
Powered by blists - more mailing lists