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Message-ID: <20210929122801.GQ964074@nvidia.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 09:28:01 -0300
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@...el.com>
Cc: David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>,
"Liu, Yi L" <yi.l.liu@...el.com>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC 08/20] vfio/pci: Add VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD
On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 06:41:00AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
> > From: David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2021 2:01 PM
> >
> > On Sun, Sep 19, 2021 at 02:38:36PM +0800, Liu Yi L wrote:
> > > This patch adds VFIO_DEVICE_BIND_IOMMUFD for userspace to bind the
> > vfio
> > > device to an iommufd. No VFIO_DEVICE_UNBIND_IOMMUFD interface is
> > provided
> > > because it's implicitly done when the device fd is closed.
> > >
> > > In concept a vfio device can be bound to multiple iommufds, each hosting
> > > a subset of I/O address spaces attached by this device.
> >
> > I really feel like this many<->many mapping between devices is going
> > to be super-confusing, and therefore make it really hard to be
> > confident we have all the rules right for proper isolation.
>
> Based on new discussion on group ownership part (patch06), I feel this
> many<->many relationship will disappear. The context fd (either container
> or iommufd) will uniquely mark the ownership on a physical device and
> its group. With this design it's impractical to have one device bound
> to multiple iommufds.
That should be a requirement! We have no way to prove that two
iommufds are the same security domain, so devices/groups cannot be
shared.
That is why the API I suggested takes in a struct file to ID the user
security context. A group is accessible only from that single struct
file and no more.
If the first series goes the way I outlined then I think David's
concern about security is strongly solved as the IOMMU layer is
directly managing it with a very clear responsiblity and semantic.
Jason
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