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Message-ID: <2ead1b1a-f5d2-f89c-b94f-071fdb99094b@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Sep 2021 12:16:55 -0700
From: "Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan"
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@...il.com>,
Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@...el.com>,
Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@...il.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux PCI <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
USB list <linux-usb@...r.kernel.org>,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for
confidential guest
+Elena
On 9/30/21 12:04 PM, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
>
>
> On 9/30/21 8:23 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 08:18:18AM -0700, Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/30/21 6:36 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>>>> And in particular, not all virtio drivers are hardened -
>>>>> I think at this point blk and scsi drivers have been hardened - so
>>>>> treating them all the same looks wrong.
>>>> My understanding was that they have been audited, Sathya?
>>>
>>> Yes, AFAIK, it has been audited. Andi also submitted some patches
>>> related to it. Andi, can you confirm.
>>
>> What is the official definition of "audited"?
>
>
> In our case (Confidential Computing platform), the host is an un-trusted
> entity. So any interaction with host from the drivers will have to be
> protected against the possible attack from the host. For example, if we
> are accessing a memory based on index value received from host, we have
> to make sure it does not lead to out of bound access or when sharing the
> memory with the host, we need to make sure only the required region is
> shared with the host and the memory is un-shared after use properly.
>
> Elena can share more details, but it was achieved with static analysis
> and fuzzing. Here is a presentation she is sharing about the work at the
> Linux Security Summit:
> https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lssna2021/b6/LSS-HardeningLinuxGuestForCCC.pdf
>
> Andi, can talk more about the specific driver changes that came out of this
> effort.
>
> In our case the driver is considered "hardened" / "audited" if it can handle
> the above scenarios.
>
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> greg k-h
>>
>
--
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
Linux Kernel Developer
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