linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for confidential guest

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Thu, 30 Sep 2021 15:49:35 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Andreas Noever <andreas.noever@...il.com>,
        Michael Jamet <michael.jamet@...el.com>,
        Yehezkel Bernat <YehezkelShB@...il.com>,
        "Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux PCI <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
        USB list <linux-usb@...r.kernel.org>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/6] virtio: Initialize authorized attribute for
 confidential guest

On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 06:36:18AM -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021 at 4:03 AM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@...hat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 06:05:09PM -0700, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> > > Confidential guest platforms like TDX have a requirement to allow
> > > only trusted devices. By default the confidential-guest core will
> > > arrange for all devices to default to unauthorized (via
> > > dev_default_authorization) in device_initialize(). Since virtio
> > > driver is already hardened against the attack from the un-trusted host,
> > > override the confidential computing default unauthorized state
> > >
> > > Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
> >
> > Architecturally this all looks backwards. IIUC nothing about virtio
> > makes it authorized or trusted. The driver is hardened,
> > true, but this should be set at the driver not the device level.
> 
> That's was my initial reaction to this proposal as well, and I ended
> up leading Sathya astray from what Greg wanted. Greg rightly points
> out that the "authorized" attribute from USB and Thunderbolt already
> exists [1] [2]. So the choice is find an awkward way to mix driver
> trust with existing bus-local "authorized" mechanisms, or promote the
> authorized capability to the driver-core. This patch set implements
> the latter to keep the momentum on the already shipping design scheme
> to not add to the driver-core maintenance burden.
> 
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQuaJ78y8j1UmBoz@kroah.com/
> [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YQzF%2FutgrJfbZuHh@kroah.com/
> 
> > And in particular, not all virtio drivers are hardened -
> > I think at this point blk and scsi drivers have been hardened - so
> > treating them all the same looks wrong.
> 
> My understanding was that they have been audited, Sathya?

Please define "audited" and "trusted" here.

thanks,

greg k-h