linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 11/13] x86/uintr: Introduce uintr

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Message-Id: <266EFCFB-D0B6-4922-8538-AA3D1146C588@amacapital.net>
Date:   Fri, 1 Oct 2021 16:04:27 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@...el.com>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        Christian Brauner <christian@...uner.io>,
        "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Raj Ashok <ashok.raj@...el.com>,
        Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Gayatri Kammela <gayatri.kammela@...el.com>,
        Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@...el.com>,
        "Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        Randy E Witt <randy.e.witt@...el.com>,
        "Shankar, Ravi V" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Ramesh Thomas <ramesh.thomas@...el.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/13] x86/uintr: Introduce uintr_wait() syscall



> On Oct 1, 2021, at 2:29 PM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Oct 01 2021 at 08:13, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
>>> On Fri, Oct 1, 2021, at 2:56 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>> On Thu, Sep 30 2021 at 21:41, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Sep 30, 2021, at 5:01 PM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Now that I read the docs some more, I'm seriously concerned about this
>>>> XSAVE design.  XSAVES with UINTR is destructive -- it clears UINV.  If
>>>> we actually use this, then the whole last_cpu "preserve the state in
>>>> registers" optimization goes out the window.  So does anything that
>>>> happens to assume that merely saving the state doesn't destroy it on
>>>> respectable modern CPUs XRSTORS will #GP if you XRSTORS twice, which
>>>> makes me nervous and would need a serious audit of our XRSTORS paths.
>>> 
>>> I have no idea what you are fantasizing about. You can XRSTORS five
>>> times in a row as long as your XSTATE memory image is correct.
>> 
>> I'm just reading TFM, which is some kind of dystopian fantasy.
>> 
>> 11.8.2.4 XRSTORS
>> 
>> Before restoring the user-interrupt state component, XRSTORS verifies
>> that UINV is 0. If it is not, XRSTORS causes a general-protection
>> fault (#GP) before loading any part of the user-interrupt state
>> component. (UINV is IA32_UINTR_MISC[39:32]; XRSTORS does not check the
>> contents of the remainder of that MSR.)
> 
> Duh. I was staring at the SDM and searching for a hint. Stupid me!
> 
>> So if UINV is set in the memory image and you XRSTORS five times in a
>> row, the first one will work assuming UINV was zero.  The second one
>> will #GP.
> 
> Yes. I can see what you mean now :)
> 
>> 11.8.2.3 XSAVES
>> After saving the user-interrupt state component, XSAVES clears UINV. (UINV is IA32_UINTR_MISC[39:32];
>> XSAVES does not modify the remainder of that MSR.)
>> 
>> So if we're running a UPID-enabled user task and we switch to a kernel
>> thread, we do XSAVES and UINV is cleared.  Then we switch back to the
>> same task and don't do XRSTORS (or otherwise write IA32_UINTR_MISC)
>> and UINV is still clear.
> 
> Yes, that has to be mopped up on the way to user space.
> 
>> And we had better clear UINV when running a kernel thread because the
>> UPID might get freed or the kernel thread might do some CPL3
>> shenanigans (via EFI, perhaps? I don't know if any firmwares actually
>> do this).
> 
> Right. That's what happens already with the current pile.
> 
>> So all this seems to put UINV into the "independent" category of
>> feature along with LBR.  And the 512-byte wastes from extra copies of
>> the legacy area and the loss of the XMODIFIED optimization will just
>> be collateral damage.
> 
> So we'd end up with two XSAVES on context switch. We can simply do:
> 
>        XSAVES();
>        fpu.state.xtsate.uintr.uinv = 0;

Could work. As long as UINV is armed, RR can change at any time (maybe just when IF=1? The manual is unclear).  But the first XSAVES disarms UINV, so maybe this won’t confuse any callers.

> 
> which allows to do as many XRSTORS in a row as we want. Only the final
> one on the way to user space will have to restore the real vector if the
> register state is not valid:
> 
>       if (fpu_state_valid()) {
>            if (needs_uinv(current)
>               wrmsrl(UINV, vector);
>       } else {
>            if (needs_uinv(current)
>               fpu.state.xtsate.uintr.uinv = vector;
>            XRSTORS();
>       }
> 
> Hmm?

I like it better than anything else I’ve seen.

> 
> Thanks,
> 
>        tglx