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Date: Sun, 3 Oct 2021 17:17:31 -0700 From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2] asymmetric_keys: verify_pefile: fix kernel-doc notation Correct the warnings from scripts/kernel-doc: crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:419: warning: Function parameter or member 'trusted_keys' not described in 'verify_pefile_signature' crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:419: warning: Excess function parameter 'trust_keys' description in 'verify_pefile_signature' crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:419: warning: No description found for return value of 'verify_pefile_signature' Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com> Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net> Cc: linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org --- v2: no changes, just rebased and resent. crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- linux-next-20211001.orig/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ linux-next-20211001/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -387,13 +387,13 @@ error_no_desc: * verify_pefile_signature - Verify the signature on a PE binary image * @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image * @pelen: Length of the binary image - * @trust_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points + * @trusted_keys: Signing certificate(s) to use as starting points * @usage: The use to which the key is being put. * * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE * binary image intersects keys we already know and trust. * - * Returns, in order of descending priority: + * Return: in order of descending priority: * * (*) -ELIBBAD if the image cannot be parsed, or: *
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