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Message-Id: <20211006203710.13326-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Oct 2021 15:37:10 -0500
From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
To: linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Nathan Tempelman <natet@...gle.com>,
Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
Steve Rutherford <srutherford@...gle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@...gle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Varad Gautam <varad.gautam@...e.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@...gle.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: [RFC 06/16] KVM: selftests: add library for creating/interacting with SEV guests
Add interfaces to allow tests to create/manage SEV guests. The
additional state associated with these guests is encapsulated in a new
struct sev_vm, which is a light wrapper around struct kvm_vm. These
VMs will use vm_set_memory_encryption() and vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages()
under the covers to configure and sync up with the core kvm_util
library on what should/shouldn't be treated as encrypted memory.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile | 1 +
.../selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h | 62 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c | 303 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 366 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
index 5832f510a16c..c7a5e1c69e0c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ endif
LIBKVM = lib/assert.c lib/elf.c lib/io.c lib/kvm_util.c lib/rbtree.c lib/sparsebit.c lib/test_util.c lib/guest_modes.c lib/perf_test_util.c
LIBKVM_x86_64 = lib/x86_64/apic.c lib/x86_64/processor.c lib/x86_64/vmx.c lib/x86_64/svm.c lib/x86_64/ucall.c lib/x86_64/handlers.S
+LIBKVM_x86_64 += lib/x86_64/sev.c
LIBKVM_aarch64 = lib/aarch64/processor.c lib/aarch64/ucall.c lib/aarch64/handlers.S
LIBKVM_s390x = lib/s390x/processor.c lib/s390x/ucall.c lib/s390x/diag318_test_handler.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d2f41b131ecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86_64/sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Helpers used for SEV guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+#ifndef SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+#define SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+
+#define SEV_DEV_PATH "/dev/sev"
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR 1
+#define SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR 30
+
+#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
+#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
+
+#define SEV_GUEST_ASSERT(sync, token, _cond) do { \
+ if (!(_cond)) \
+ sev_guest_abort(sync, token, 0); \
+} while (0)
+
+enum {
+ SEV_GSTATE_UNINIT = 0,
+ SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
+ SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
+};
+
+struct sev_sync_data {
+ uint32_t token;
+ bool pending;
+ bool done;
+ bool aborted;
+ uint64_t info;
+};
+
+struct sev_vm;
+
+void sev_guest_sync(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info);
+void sev_guest_done(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info);
+void sev_guest_abort(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info);
+
+void sev_check_guest_sync(struct kvm_run *run, struct sev_sync_data *sync,
+ uint32_t token);
+void sev_check_guest_done(struct kvm_run *run, struct sev_sync_data *sync,
+ uint32_t token);
+
+void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data);
+struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev);
+uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev);
+
+struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages);
+void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev);
+void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev);
+void sev_vm_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement);
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev);
+
+#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..adda3b396566
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Helpers used for SEV guests
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "kvm_util.h"
+#include "linux/psp-sev.h"
+#include "processor.h"
+#include "sev.h"
+
+#define PAGE_SHIFT 12
+#define PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PAGE_SHIFT)
+
+struct sev_vm {
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+ int fd;
+ int enc_bit;
+ uint32_t sev_policy;
+};
+
+/* Helpers for coordinating between guests and test harness. */
+
+void sev_guest_sync(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info)
+{
+ sync->token = token;
+ sync->info = info;
+ sync->pending = true;
+
+ asm volatile("hlt" : : : "memory");
+}
+
+void sev_guest_done(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info)
+{
+ while (true) {
+ sync->done = true;
+ sev_guest_sync(sync, token, info);
+ }
+}
+
+void sev_guest_abort(struct sev_sync_data *sync, uint32_t token, uint64_t info)
+{
+ while (true) {
+ sync->aborted = true;
+ sev_guest_sync(sync, token, info);
+ }
+}
+
+void sev_check_guest_sync(struct kvm_run *run, struct sev_sync_data *sync,
+ uint32_t token)
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT(run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_HLT,
+ "unexpected exit reason: %u (%s)",
+ run->exit_reason, exit_reason_str(run->exit_reason));
+ TEST_ASSERT(sync->token == token,
+ "unexpected guest token, expected %d, got: %d", token,
+ sync->token);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!sync->done, "unexpected guest state");
+ TEST_ASSERT(!sync->aborted, "unexpected guest state");
+ sync->pending = false;
+}
+
+void sev_check_guest_done(struct kvm_run *run, struct sev_sync_data *sync,
+ uint32_t token)
+{
+ TEST_ASSERT(run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_HLT,
+ "unexpected exit reason: %u (%s)",
+ run->exit_reason, exit_reason_str(run->exit_reason));
+ TEST_ASSERT(sync->token == token,
+ "unexpected guest token, expected %d, got: %d", token,
+ sync->token);
+ TEST_ASSERT(sync->done, "unexpected guest state");
+ TEST_ASSERT(!sync->aborted, "unexpected guest state");
+ sync->pending = false;
+}
+
+/* Common SEV helpers/accessors. */
+
+struct kvm_vm *sev_get_vm(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ return sev->vm;
+}
+
+uint8_t sev_get_enc_bit(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ return sev->enc_bit;
+}
+
+void sev_ioctl(int sev_fd, int cmd, void *data)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
+
+ arg.cmd = cmd;
+ arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
+ ret = ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
+ "SEV ioctl %d failed, error: %d, fw_error: %d",
+ cmd, ret, arg.error);
+}
+
+void kvm_sev_ioctl(struct sev_vm *sev, int cmd, void *data)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd arg = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ arg.id = cmd;
+ arg.sev_fd = sev->fd;
+ arg.data = (__u64)data;
+
+ ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &arg);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0,
+ "SEV KVM ioctl %d failed, rc: %i errno: %i (%s), fw_error: %d",
+ cmd, ret, errno, strerror(errno), arg.error);
+}
+
+/* Local helpers. */
+
+static void
+sev_register_user_range(struct sev_vm *sev, void *hva, uint64_t size)
+{
+ struct kvm_enc_region range = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_debug("register_user_range: hva: %p, size: %lu\n", hva, size);
+
+ range.addr = (__u64)hva;
+ range.size = size;
+
+ ret = ioctl(vm_get_fd(sev->vm), KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0, "failed to register user range, errno: %i\n", errno);
+}
+
+static void
+sev_encrypt_phy_range(struct sev_vm *sev, vm_paddr_t gpa, uint64_t size)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data ksev_update_data = {0};
+
+ pr_debug("encrypt_phy_range: addr: 0x%lx, size: %lu\n", gpa, size);
+
+ ksev_update_data.uaddr = (__u64)addr_gpa2hva(sev->vm, gpa);
+ ksev_update_data.len = size;
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &ksev_update_data);
+}
+
+static void sev_encrypt(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ struct sparsebit *enc_phy_pages;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm = sev->vm;
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg = 0;
+ vm_paddr_t gpa_start;
+ uint64_t memory_size;
+
+ /* Only memslot 0 supported for now. */
+ enc_phy_pages = vm_get_encrypted_phy_pages(sev->vm, 0, &gpa_start, &memory_size);
+ TEST_ASSERT(enc_phy_pages, "Unable to retrieve encrypted pages bitmap");
+ while (pg < (memory_size / vm_get_page_size(vm))) {
+ sparsebit_idx_t pg_cnt;
+
+ if (sparsebit_is_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg)) {
+ pg = sparsebit_next_set(enc_phy_pages, pg);
+ if (!pg)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pg_cnt = sparsebit_next_clear(enc_phy_pages, pg) - pg;
+ if (pg_cnt <= 0)
+ pg_cnt = 1;
+
+ sev_encrypt_phy_range(sev,
+ gpa_start + pg * vm_get_page_size(vm),
+ pg_cnt * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+ pg += pg_cnt;
+ }
+
+ sparsebit_free(&enc_phy_pages);
+}
+
+/* SEV VM implementation. */
+
+static struct sev_vm *sev_common_create(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_status sev_status = {0};
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ int sev_fd;
+
+ sev_fd = open(SEV_DEV_PATH, O_RDWR);
+ if (sev_fd < 0) {
+ pr_info("Failed to open SEV device, path: %s, error: %d, skipping test.\n",
+ SEV_DEV_PATH, sev_fd);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sev_ioctl(sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &sev_status);
+
+ if (!(sev_status.api_major > SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR ||
+ (sev_status.api_major == SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR &&
+ sev_status.api_minor >= SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR))) {
+ pr_info("SEV FW version too old. Have API %d.%d (build: %d), need %d.%d, skipping test.\n",
+ sev_status.api_major, sev_status.api_minor, sev_status.build,
+ SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MAJOR, SEV_FW_REQ_VER_MINOR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ sev = calloc(1, sizeof(*sev));
+ sev->fd = sev_fd;
+ sev->vm = vm;
+
+ /* Get encryption bit via CPUID. */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ sev->enc_bit = ebx & 0x3F;
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+static void sev_common_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ close(sev->fd);
+ free(sev);
+}
+
+struct sev_vm *sev_vm_create(uint32_t policy, uint64_t npages)
+{
+ struct sev_vm *sev;
+ struct kvm_vm *vm;
+
+ /* Need to handle memslots after init, and after setting memcrypt. */
+ vm = vm_create(VM_MODE_DEFAULT, 0, O_RDWR);
+ sev = sev_common_create(vm);
+ if (!sev)
+ return NULL;
+ sev->sev_policy = policy;
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
+
+ vm_set_memory_encryption(vm, true, true, sev->enc_bit);
+ vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, npages, 0);
+ sev_register_user_range(sev, addr_gpa2hva(vm, 0), npages * vm_get_page_size(vm));
+
+ pr_info("SEV guest created, policy: 0x%x, size: %lu KB\n",
+ sev->sev_policy, npages * vm_get_page_size(vm) / 1024);
+
+ return sev;
+}
+
+void sev_vm_free(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ kvm_vm_free(sev->vm);
+ sev_common_free(sev);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start ksev_launch_start = {0};
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
+
+ ksev_launch_start.policy = sev->sev_policy;
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &ksev_launch_start);
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.policy == sev->sev_policy, "Incorrect guest policy.");
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+
+ sev_encrypt(sev);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_measure(struct sev_vm *sev, uint8_t *measurement)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure ksev_launch_measure = {0};
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_guest_status = {0};
+
+ ksev_launch_measure.len = 256;
+ ksev_launch_measure.uaddr = (__u64)measurement;
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &ksev_launch_measure);
+
+ /* Measurement causes a state transition, check that. */
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_guest_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_guest_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_guest_status.state);
+}
+
+void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct sev_vm *sev)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status ksev_status = {0};
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LUPDATE ||
+ ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_LSECRET,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, NULL);
+
+ kvm_sev_ioctl(sev, KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS, &ksev_status);
+ TEST_ASSERT(ksev_status.state == SEV_GSTATE_RUNNING,
+ "Unexpected guest state: %d", ksev_status.state);
+}
--
2.25.1
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