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Message-Id: <20211009003711.1390019-2-sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 2021 17:36:56 -0700
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
Richard Henderson <rth@...ddle.net>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@...ha.franken.de>,
James E J Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>,
Helge Deller <deller@....de>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"Michael S . Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter H Anvin <hpa@...or.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Kirill Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <knsathya@...nel.org>,
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-pci@...r.kernel.org,
linux-alpha@...r.kernel.org, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linux-parisc@...r.kernel.org, sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/mm: Move force_dma_unencrypted() to common code
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to access guest private memory. Any memory
that is required for communication with VMM must be shared explicitly
by setting the bit in page table entry. After setting the shared bit,
the conversion must be completed with MapGPA hypercall. Details about
MapGPA hypercall can be found in [1], sec 3.2.
The call informs VMM about the conversion between private/shared
mappings. The shared memory is similar to unencrypted memory in AMD
SME/SEV terminology but the underlying process of sharing/un-sharing
the memory is different for Intel TDX guest platform.
SEV assumes that I/O devices can only do DMA to "decrypted" physical
addresses without the C-bit set. In order for the CPU to interact with
this memory, the CPU needs a decrypted mapping. To add this support,
AMD SME code forces force_dma_unencrypted() to return true for
platforms that support AMD SEV feature. It will be used for DMA memory
allocation API to trigger set_memory_decrypted() for platforms that
support AMD SEV feature.
TDX is similar. So, to communicate with I/O devices, related pages need
to be marked as shared. As mentioned above, shared memory in TDX
architecture is similar to decrypted memory in AMD SME/SEV. So similar
to AMD SEV, force_dma_unencrypted() has to forced to return true. This
support is added in other patches in this series.
So move force_dma_unencrypted() out of AMD specific code and call AMD
specific (amd_force_dma_unencrypted()) initialization function from it.
force_dma_unencrypted() will be modified by later patches to include
Intel TDX guest platform specific initialization.
Also, introduce new config option X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON that has to be
selected by all x86 memory encryption features. This will be selected
by both AMD SEV and Intel TDX guest config options.
This is preparation for TDX changes in DMA code and it has no
functional change.
[1] - https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
---
Changes since v4:
* Removed used we/you from commit log.
Change since v3:
* None
Changes since v1:
* Removed sev_active(), sme_active() checks in force_dma_unencrypted().
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 ++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index af49ad084919..37b27412f52e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1519,16 +1519,20 @@ config X86_CPA_STATISTICS
helps to determine the effectiveness of preserving large and huge
page mappings when mapping protections are changed.
+config X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
+ select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
+ select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+ def_bool n
+
config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
bool "AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support"
depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_AMD
select DMA_COHERENT_POOL
- select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
select ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
- select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED
select INSTRUCTION_DECODER
select ARCH_HAS_RESTRICTED_VIRTIO_MEMORY_ACCESS
select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
+ select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON
help
Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory.
This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..697bc40a4e3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (C) 2020 Intel Corporation */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev);
+#else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+static inline bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 5864219221ca..b31cb52bf1bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT_COMMON) += mem_encrypt_common.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_identity.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 23d54b810f08..5d7fbed73949 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h>
#include "mm_internal.h"
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
}
/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
-bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
+bool amd_force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
{
/*
* For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses.
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f063c885b0a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Memory Encryption Support Common Code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/mem_encrypt_common.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+
+/* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */
+bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
+{
+ return amd_force_dma_unencrypted(dev);
+}
--
2.25.1
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