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Message-ID: <BYAPR11MB325670EF536F5C4766C18D19A9B79@BYAPR11MB3256.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Oct 2021 10:25:18 +0000
From:   "Liu, Jing2" <jing2.liu@...el.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "Bae, Chang Seok" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@...ux.intel.com>,
        "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>,
        "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
        Jing Liu <jing2.liu@...ux.intel.com>,
        "seanjc@...gle.com" <seanjc@...gle.com>
Subject: RE: [patch 13/31] x86/fpu: Move KVMs FPU swapping to FPU core


On 13/10/21 10:42, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 13/10/21 09:46, Liu, Jing2 wrote:
> >
> >> On 13/10/21 08:15, Liu, Jing2 wrote:
> >>> After KVM passthrough XFD to guest, when vmexit opening irq window
> >>> and KVM is interrupted, kernel softirq path can call
> >>> kernel_fpu_begin() to touch xsave state. This function does XSAVES.
> >>> If guest XFD[18] is 1, and with guest AMX state in register, then
> >>> guest AMX state is lost by XSAVES.
> >>
> >> Yes, the host value of XFD (which is zero) has to be restored after vmexit.
> >> See how KVM already handles SPEC_CTRL.
> >
> > I'm trying to understand why qemu's XFD is zero after kernel supports AMX.
> 
> There are three copies of XFD:
> 
> - the guest value stored in vcpu->arch.

OK, let's call it e.g. vcpu->arch.xfd

[...]
> - the internal KVM value attached to guest_fpu.  When #NM happens, this
> one becomes zero.

> The CPU value is:
> 
> - the guest_fpu value between kvm_load_guest_fpu and kvm_put_guest_fpu.
>   This ensures that no state is lost in the case you are describing.
> 

OK, you mean using guest_fpu as a KVM value. Let me describe the
flow to see if anything missing.

When #NM trap which makes passthrough, guest_fpu XFD set to 0 and keeps
forever. (don't change HW XFD which is still 1)
In the #NM trap, KVM alloc buffer and regenerate a #NM exception to guest
to make guest kernel alloc its thread buffer. 
Then in next vmexit, KVM sync vcpu->arch.xfd, load guest_fpu value (=0) and
update current->thread.fpu XFD to 0 for kernel reference. 


> - the OR of the guest value and the guest_fpu value while the guest runs
> (using either MSR load/save lists, or manual wrmsr like
> pt_guest_enter/pt_guest_exit).  This ensures that the host has the
> opportunity to get a #NM exception, and allocate AMX state in the
> guest_fpu and in current->thread.fpu.
> 
> > Yes, passthrough is done by two cases: one is guest #NM trapped;
> > another is guest clearing XFD before it generates #NM (this is possible for
> > guest), then passthrough.
> > For the two cases, we passthrough and allocate buffer for guest_fpu, and
> > current->thread.fpu.
> 
> I think it's simpler to always wait for #NM, it will only happen once
> per vCPU.  In other words, even if the guest clears XFD before it
> generates #NM, the guest_fpu's XFD remains nonzero 

You mean a wrmsr trap doesn't do anything and return back?
In this case, when next vmenter, the OR of the guest value 
(vcpu->arch.xfd) and the guest_fpu value is still 1, so this 
doesn't obey guest's HW assumption? (guest finds the wrmsr 
didn't work)
 
Thanks,
Jing

and an #NM vmexit is
> possible.  After #NM the guest_fpu's XFD is zero; then passthrough can
> happen and the #NM vmexit trap can be disabled.

> 
> Paolo

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