linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 1/2] ima: define ima_trusted

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Message-ID: <922a8f6f8cc85b04be574c4dcb5430559af67618.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Oct 2021 10:34:49 -0400
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc:     Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] ima: define ima_trusted_for hook

On Wed, 2021-10-13 at 07:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> A major interpreter integrity gap exists which allows files read by
> the interpreter to be executed without measuring the file or verifying
> the file's signature.
> 
> The kernel has no knowledge about the file being read by the interpreter.
> Only the interpreter knows the context(eg. data, execute) and must be
> trusted to provide that information accurately.
> 
> To close this integrity gap, define an ima_trusted_for hook to allow
> IMA to measure the file and verify the file's signature based on policy.
> 
> Sample policy rules:
> 	measure func=TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK
> 	appraise func=TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK

To require file signatures, the policy rule should be:
	appraise func=TRUSTED_FOR_CHECK appraise_type=imasig
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>