| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Fri, 15 Oct 2021 14:56:59 +0800
From: yanghui <yanghui.def@...edance.com>
To: brookxu <brookxu.cn@...il.com>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Stephen Boyd <sboyd@...nel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] Clocksource: Avoid misjudgment of clocksource
在 2021/10/14 下午3:03, yanghui 写道:
>
>
> 在 2021/10/12 下午4:06, brookxu 写道:
>>
>>
>> John Stultz wrote on 2021/10/12 13:29:
>>> On Mon, Oct 11, 2021 at 10:23 PM brookxu <brookxu.cn@...il.com> wrote:
>>>> John Stultz wrote on 2021/10/12 12:52 下午:
>>>>> On Sat, Oct 9, 2021 at 7:04 AM brookxu <brookxu.cn@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> hello
>>>>>>
>>>>>> John Stultz wrote on 2021/10/9 7:45:
>>>>>>> On Fri, Oct 8, 2021 at 1:03 AM yanghui
>>>>>>> <yanghui.def@...edance.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> clocksource_watchdog is executed every WATCHDOG_INTERVAL(0.5s) by
>>>>>>>> Timer. But sometimes system is very busy and the Timer cannot be
>>>>>>>> executed in 0.5sec. For example,if clocksource_watchdog be executed
>>>>>>>> after 10sec, the calculated value of abs(cs_nsec - wd_nsec) will
>>>>>>>> be enlarged. Then the current clocksource will be misjudged as
>>>>>>>> unstable. So we add conditions to prevent the clocksource from
>>>>>>>> being misjudged.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: yanghui <yanghui.def@...edance.com>
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>> kernel/time/clocksource.c | 6 +++++-
>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/time/clocksource.c b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>>>>>>>> index b8a14d2fb5ba..d535beadcbc8 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -136,8 +136,10 @@ static void
>>>>>>>> __clocksource_change_rating(struct clocksource *cs, int rating);
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> /*
>>>>>>>> * Interval: 0.5sec.
>>>>>>>> + * MaxInterval: 1s.
>>>>>>>> */
>>>>>>>> #define WATCHDOG_INTERVAL (HZ >> 1)
>>>>>>>> +#define WATCHDOG_MAX_INTERVAL_NS (NSEC_PER_SEC)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> static void clocksource_watchdog_work(struct work_struct *work)
>>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>> @@ -404,7 +406,9 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(struct
>>>>>>>> timer_list *unused)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> /* Check the deviation from the watchdog
>>>>>>>> clocksource. */
>>>>>>>> md = cs->uncertainty_margin +
>>>>>>>> watchdog->uncertainty_margin;
>>>>>>>> - if (abs(cs_nsec - wd_nsec) > md) {
>>>>>>>> + if ((abs(cs_nsec - wd_nsec) > md) &&
>>>>>>>> + cs_nsec < WATCHDOG_MAX_INTERVAL_NS &&
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry, it's been awhile since I looked at this code, but why are you
>>>>>>> bounding the clocksource delta here?
>>>>>>> It seems like if the clocksource being watched was very wrong
>>>>>>> (with a
>>>>>>> delta larger than the MAX_INTERVAL_NS), we'd want to throw it out.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> + wd_nsec < WATCHDOG_MAX_INTERVAL_NS) {
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Bounding the watchdog interval on the check does seem reasonable.
>>>>>>> Though one may want to keep track that if we are seeing too many of
>>>>>>> these delayed watchdog checks we provide some feedback via dmesg.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For some fast timeout timers, such as acpi-timer, checking wd_nsec
>>>>>> should not
>>>>>> make much sense, because when wacthdog is called, the timer may
>>>>>> overflow many
>>>>>> times.
>>>>>
>>>>> Indeed. But in that case we can't tell which way is up. This is what I
>>>>> was fretting about when I said:
>>>>>> So I do worry these watchdog robustness fixes are papering over a
>>>>>> problem, pushing expectations closer to the edge of how far the
>>>>>> system
>>>>>> should tolerate bad behavior. Because at some point we'll fall
>>>>>> off. :)
>>>>>
>>>>> If the timer is delayed long enough for the watchdog to wrap, we're
>>>>> way out of tolerable behavior. There's not much we can do because we
>>>>> can't even tell what happened.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in the case where the watchdog has not wrapped, I don't see a
>>>>> major issue with trying to be a bit more robust in the face of just
>>>>> slightly delayed timers.
>>>>> (And yes, we can't really distinguish between slightly delayed and
>>>>> watchdog-wrap-interval + slight delay, but in either case we can
>>>>> probably skip disqualifying the clocksource as we know something seems
>>>>> off)
>>>>
>>>> If we record the watchdog's start_time in
>>>> clocksource_start_watchdog(), and then
>>>> when we verify cycles in clocksource_watchdog(), check whether the
>>>> clocksource
>>>> watchdog is blocked. Due to MSB verification, if the blocked time is
>>>> greater than
>>>> half of the watchdog timer max_cycles, then we can safely ignore the
>>>> current
>>>> verification? Do you think this idea is okay?
>>>
>>> I can't say I totally understand the idea. Maybe could you clarify
>>> with a patch?
>>>
>>
>> Sorry, it looks almost as follows:
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/time/clocksource.c b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>> index b8a14d2..87f3b67 100644
>> --- a/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>> +++ b/kernel/time/clocksource.c
>> @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
>> static DECLARE_WORK(watchdog_work, clocksource_watchdog_work);
>> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(watchdog_lock);
>> static int watchdog_running;
>> +static unsigned long watchdog_start_time;
>> static atomic_t watchdog_reset_pending;
>> static inline void clocksource_watchdog_lock(unsigned long *flags)
>> @@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(struct timer_list
>> *unused)
>> int next_cpu, reset_pending;
>> int64_t wd_nsec, cs_nsec;
>> struct clocksource *cs;
>> + unsigned long max_jiffies;
>> u32 md;
>> spin_lock(&watchdog_lock);
>> @@ -402,6 +404,10 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(struct
>> timer_list *unused)
>> if (atomic_read(&watchdog_reset_pending))
>> continue;
>> + max_jiffies = nsecs_to_jiffies(cs->max_idle_ns);
>> + if (time_is_before_jiffies(watchdog_start_time + max_jiffies))
>> + continue;
>> +
Hi John:
What do you think of this suggest？If the interval between two
executions of the function clocksource_watchdog() exceeds max_idle_ns.
We think the current judement is unreasonable,so we skip this judgment.
>> /* Check the deviation from the watchdog clocksource. */
>> md = cs->uncertainty_margin + watchdog->uncertainty_margin;
>> if (abs(cs_nsec - wd_nsec) > md) {
>> @@ -474,6 +480,7 @@ static void clocksource_watchdog(struct timer_list
>> *unused)
>> * pair clocksource_stop_watchdog() clocksource_start_watchdog().
>> */
>> if (!timer_pending(&watchdog_timer)) {
>> + watchdog_start_time = jiffies;
>> watchdog_timer.expires += WATCHDOG_INTERVAL;
>> add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, next_cpu);
>> }
>> @@ -488,6 +495,7 @@ static inline void clocksource_start_watchdog(void)
>> timer_setup(&watchdog_timer, clocksource_watchdog, 0);
>> watchdog_timer.expires = jiffies + WATCHDOG_INTERVAL;
>> add_timer_on(&watchdog_timer, cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask));
>> + watchdog_start_time = jiffies;
>> watchdog_running = 1;
>> }
>>
>>
>>> thanks
>>> -john
>>>
>
> It looks good to me.
> thanks.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists