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Message-ID: <b46d9bfe-17a9-0de9-271d-a3e6429e3f5f@redhat.com>
Date:   Fri, 15 Oct 2021 10:03:50 +0200
From:   David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To:     Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
Cc:     Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
        John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Colin Cross <ccross@...gle.com>,
        Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@...aro.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Johannes Weiner <hannes@...xchg.org>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>, rppt@...nel.org,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        vincenzo.frascino@....com,
        Chinwen Chang (張錦文) 
        <chinwen.chang@...iatek.com>,
        Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@...gle.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, apopple@...dia.com,
        Yu Zhao <yuzhao@...gle.com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
        fenghua.yu@...el.com, thunder.leizhen@...wei.com,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>, feng.tang@...el.com,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Roman Gushchin <guro@...com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, krisman@...labora.com,
        Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>,
        Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>, legion@...nel.org,
        Rolf Eike Beer <eb@...ix.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>,
        Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>,
        Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@...gle.com>, sashal@...nel.org,
        cxfcosmos@...il.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 3/3] mm: add anonymous vma name refcounting

On 14.10.21 22:16, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 10:01 AM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 12, 2021 at 12:44 AM David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm still evaluating the proposal to use memfds but I'm not sure if
>>>> the issue that David Hildenbrand mentioned about additional memory
>>>> consumed in pagecache (which has to be addressed) is the only one we
>>>> will encounter with this approach. If anyone knows of any potential
>>>> issues with using memfds as named anonymous memory, I would really
>>>> appreciate your feedback before I go too far in that direction.
>>>
>>> [MAP_PRIVATE memfd only behave that way with 4k, not with huge pages, so
>>> I think it just has to be fixed. It doesn't make any sense to allocate a
>>> page for the pagecache ("populate the file") when accessing via a
>>> private mapping that's supposed to leave the file untouched]
>>>
>>> My gut feeling is if you really need a string as identifier, then try
>>> going with memfds. Yes, we might hit some road blocks to be sorted out,
>>> but it just logically makes sense to me: Files have names. These names
>>> exist before mapping and after mapping. They "name" the content.
>>
>> I'm investigating this direction. I don't have much background with
>> memfds, so I'll need to digest the code first.
> 
> I've done some investigation into the possibility of using memfds to
> name anonymous VMAs. Here are my findings:

Thanks for exploring the alternatives!

> 
> 1. Forking a process with anonymous vmas named using memfd is 5-15%
> slower than with prctl (depends on the number of VMAs in the process
> being forked). Profiling shows that i_mmap_lock_write() dominates
> dup_mmap(). Exit path is also slower by roughly 9% with
> free_pgtables() and fput() dominating exit_mmap(). Fork performance is
> important for Android because almost all processes are forked from
> zygote, therefore this limitation already makes this approach
> prohibitive.

Interesting, naturally I wonder if that can be optimized.

> 
> 2. mremap() usage to grow the mapping has an issue when used with memfds:
> 
> fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
> ftruncate(fd, size_bytes);
> ptr = mmap(NULL, size_bytes, prot, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
> close(fd);
> ptr = mremap(ptr, size_bytes, size_bytes * 2, MREMAP_MAYMOVE);
> touch_mem(ptr, size_bytes * 2);
> 
> This would generate a SIGBUS in touch_mem(). I believe it's because
> ftruncate() specified the size to be size_bytes and we are accessing
> more than that after remapping. prctl() does not have this limitation
> and we do have a usecase for growing a named VMA.

Can't you simply size the memfd much larger? I mean, it doesn't really
cost much, does it?

> 
> 3. Leaves an fd exposed, even briefly, which may lead to unexpected
> flaws (e.g. anything using mmap MAP_SHARED could allow exposures or
> overwrites). Even MAP_PRIVATE, if an attacker writes into the file
> after ftruncate() and before mmap(), can cause private memory to be
> initialized with unexpected data.

I don't quite follow. Can you elaborate what exactly the issue here is?
We use a temporary fd, yes, but how is that a problem?

Any attacker can just write any random memory memory in the address
space, so I don't see the issue.

> 
> 4. There is a usecase in the Android userspace where vma naming
> happens after memory was allocated. Bionic linker does in-memory
> relocations and then names some relocated sections.

Would renaming a memfd be an option or is that "too late" ?

> 
> In the light of these findings, could the current patchset be reconsidered?
> Thanks,
> Suren.
> 


-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb

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