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Message-ID: <YW3M40tOILjI3DiD@zn.tnic>
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 21:37:07 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Jane Malalane <jane.malalane@...rix.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Pu Wen <puwen@...on.cn>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
Yazen Ghannam <Yazen.Ghannam@....com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Huang Rui <ray.huang@....com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/cpu: Fix migration safety with X86_BUG_NULL_SEL
On Mon, Oct 18, 2021 at 07:29:41PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> This isn't correct. When running as a guest, the intended behavior is to fully
> trust the CPUID.0x80000021 bit.
Really? Because I'm coming from an SEV-SNP mail thread where we don't
trust the HV at all and we even hand in a CPUID page into the guest...
:-P
> If bit 6 is set, yay, the hypervisor has told the kernel that it
> will only ever run on hardware without the bug. If bit 6 is clear
> and HYPERVISOR is true, then the FMS crud can't be trusted because
> the kernel _may_ run on affected hardware in the future even if the
> current underlying hardware is not affected.
Ok, I see, then the CPUID check needs to go first, makes sense.
> I agree. If the argument for this patch is that the kernel can be migrated to
> older hardware, then it stands to reason that the kernel could also be migrated
> to a different CPU vendor entirely. E.g. start on Intel, migrate to Zen1, kaboom.
Migration across vendors? Really, that works?
I'll believe it only when I see it with my own eyes.
:-)
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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