linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts

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Message-ID: <20211020022529-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 20 Oct 2021 02:56:27 -0400
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>
Cc:     Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@...cle.com>,
        "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>,
        "kaplan, david" <david.kaplan@....com>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "Hetzelt, Felicitas" <f.hetzelt@...berlin.de>,
        linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        virtualization <virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 06/12] virtio_pci: harden MSI-X interrupts

On Wed, Oct 20, 2021 at 09:33:49AM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> > In my own opinion, the threat model is:
> >
> > Attacker: 'malicious' hypervisor
> >
> > Victim: VM with SEV/TDX/SGX
> >
> > The attacker should not be able to steal secure/private data from VM, when the
> > hypervisor's action is unexpected. DoS is out of the scope.
> >
> > My concern is: it is very hard to clearly explain in the patchset how the
> > hypervisor is able to steal VM's data, by setting queue=0 or injecting unwanted
> > interrupts to VM.
> 
> Yes, it's a hard question but instead of trying to answer that, we can
> just fix the case of e.g unexpected interrupts.
> 
> Thanks

I think this it's still early days for TDX. So it's a bit early to talk
about threat models, start opening CVEs and distinguishing between
security and non-security bugs.

-- 
MST