linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH rdma-rc 1/2] RDMA/sa_query: Use strscpy

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Message-ID: <20211025170242.GA395634@nvidia.com>
Date:   Mon, 25 Oct 2021 14:02:42 -0300
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To:     Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
Cc:     Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>,
        Mark Zhang <markzhang@...dia.com>,
        Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>,
        John Fleck <john.fleck@...el.com>,
        Kaike Wan <kaike.wan@...el.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, Mark Bloch <markb@...lanox.com>,
        Mark Bloch <mbloch@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-rc 1/2] RDMA/sa_query: Use strscpy_pad instead of
 memcpy to copy a string

On Sun, Oct 24, 2021 at 09:08:20AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> From: Mark Zhang <markzhang@...dia.com>
> 
> When copy the device name, the length of data memcpy copied exceeds
> the length of the source buffer, which cause the KASAN issue below.
> Use strscpy_pad instead.
> 
>  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core]
>  Read of size 64 at addr ffff88811a10f5e0 by task rping/140263
>  CPU: 3 PID: 140263 Comm: rping Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1+ #1
>  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>  Call Trace:
>  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
>  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0xa0
>  kasan_report+0xcb/0x110
>  ? lock_downgrade+0xb0/0xc0
>  ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core]
>  kasan_check_range+0x13d/0x180
>  memcpy+0x20/0x60
>  ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x136/0x320 [ib_core]
>  ? init_mad+0xf0/0xf0 [ib_core]
>  ? __nlmsg_put+0x9a/0xb0
>  ? ibnl_put_msg+0x90/0xd0 [ib_core]
>  ib_nl_make_request+0x1c6/0x380 [ib_core]
>  ? ib_nl_set_path_rec_attrs+0x320/0x320 [ib_core]
>  ? netlink_has_listeners+0x114/0x210
>  send_mad+0x20a/0x220 [ib_core]
>  ? ib_nl_make_request+0x380/0x380 [ib_core]
>  ? memcpy+0x39/0x60
>  ? value_read+0x20/0x80 [ib_core]
>  ? ib_pack+0x140/0x2a0 [ib_core]
>  ib_sa_path_rec_get+0x3e3/0x800 [ib_core]
>  ? alloc_mad+0x390/0x390 [ib_core]
>  ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
>  ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm]
>  ? ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm]
>  ? ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm]
>  ? vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0
>  ? ksys_write+0x133/0x160
>  ? do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
>  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>  ? print_usage_bug+0x50/0x50
>  ? lock_downgrade+0xc0/0xc0
>  cma_query_ib_route+0x29b/0x390 [rdma_cm]
>  ? rdma_set_ib_path+0x150/0x150 [rdma_cm]
>  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
>  ? rdma_create_user_id+0x80/0x80 [rdma_cm]
>  ? rdma_resolve_route+0x37b/0x3e0 [rdma_cm]
>  ? rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm]
>  rdma_resolve_route+0x308/0x3e0 [rdma_cm]
>  ucma_resolve_route+0xe1/0x150 [rdma_ucm]
>  ? ucma_disconnect+0x140/0x140 [rdma_ucm]
>  ucma_write+0x17b/0x1f0 [rdma_ucm]
>  ? ucma_copy_ib_route+0x1a0/0x1a0 [rdma_ucm]
>  ? __fget_files+0x146/0x240
>  vfs_write+0x142/0x4d0
>  ksys_write+0x133/0x160
>  ? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
>  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
>  ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
>  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>  RIP: 0033:0x7f26499aa90f
>  Code: 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 29 fd ff ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 24 10 41 89 c0 8b 7c 24 08 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 31 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 5c fd ff ff 48
>  RSP: 002b:00007f26495f2dc0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
>  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000007d0 RCX: 00007f26499aa90f
>  RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007f26495f2e00 RDI: 0000000000000003
>  RBP: 00005632a8315440 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
>  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f26495f2e00
>  R13: 00005632a83154e0 R14: 00005632a8315440 R15: 00005632a830a810
> 
>  Allocated by task 131419:
>  kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
>  __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90
>  proc_self_get_link+0x8b/0x100
>  pick_link+0x4f1/0x5c0
>  step_into+0x2eb/0x3d0
>  walk_component+0xc8/0x2c0
>  link_path_walk+0x3b8/0x580
>  path_openat+0x101/0x230
>  do_filp_open+0x12e/0x240
>  do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x280
>  __x64_sys_openat+0xce/0x140
>  do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> 
>  The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88811a10f5e0
>  kmalloc-16 of size 16
>  The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> 10f5e0, ffff88811a10f5f0)
>  The buggy address belongs to the page:
>  page:000000007b6da7b1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88811a10f1e0 pfn:0x11a10f
>  flags: 0x8000000000000200(slab|zone=2)
>  raw: 8000000000000200 ffffea0004463040 0000001200000012 ffff8881000423c0
>  raw: ffff88811a10f1e0 000000008080007f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
>  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> 
>  Memory state around the buggy address:
>  ffff88811a10f480: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc
>  ffff88811a10f500: fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc
>  >ffff88811a10f580: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc
>  ^
>  ffff88811a10f600: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc
>  ffff88811a10f680: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc
> 
> Fixes: 2ca546b92a02 ("IB/sa: Route SA pathrecord query through netlink")
> Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@...dia.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@...dia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
> ---
>  drivers/infiniband/core/sa_query.c | 5 +++--
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Applied to for-rc, thanks

Jason