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Message-ID: <20211028193658.7n2oehp6yogyqbwq@gupta-dev2.localdomain>
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2021 12:36:58 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Wang Kefeng <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
Uwe Kleine-König
<u.kleine-koenig@...gutronix.de>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] arch/Kconfig: Make CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE available
for all architectures
On 28.10.2021 14:49, Mark Rutland wrote:
>On Wed, Oct 27, 2021 at 06:33:22PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
>> Borrow CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE from ARM to be available for all
>> architectures. This will help in configuration of features that depend
>> on CPU being affected by spectre class of vulnerabilities.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
>
>Given that spectre isn't one specific issue, biut rather a blanket term
>for a bunch of things that can have variable overlap, I don't think this
>makes much sense unless we're going to add finer-grained options for all
>the variants, and IMO it'd make more sene for the architectures to
>directly select the things that'd otherwise be dependent on this.
Isn't ARM already using CPU_SPECTRE for selecting things:
config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
depends on CPU_SPECTRE
This was the whole motivation for doing the same for x86.
Adding a condition for all architectures is also okay, but its going to
a little messier:
config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF
default y if X86 || ARM || ...
This approach would make sense if architectures wants to explicitly
select the defaults irrespective of architecture being affected by
spectre.
If that's the case I will change the BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF default to
depend on architecture. I hope BPF maintainer, Daniel is okay with it?
Pawan
Added BPF maintainers and bpf@...r to cc.
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