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Message-ID: <20211029225109.d3m2q4kuuzhzs2cv@gupta-dev2.localdomain>
Date: Fri, 29 Oct 2021 15:51:09 -0700
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@...linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@...radead.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>,
"Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Wang Kefeng <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
Uwe Kleine-König
<u.kleine-koenig@...gutronix.de>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] arch/Kconfig: Make CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE available
for all architectures
On 29.10.2021 11:08, Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
>On Thu, Oct 28, 2021 at 12:36:58PM -0700, Pawan Gupta wrote:
>> Isn't ARM already using CPU_SPECTRE for selecting things:
>>
>> config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>> bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
>> depends on CPU_SPECTRE
>>
>> This was the whole motivation for doing the same for x86.
>>
>> Adding a condition for all architectures is also okay, but its going to
>> a little messier:
>>
>> config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF
>> default y if X86 || ARM || ...
>
>It doesn't have to be (but sadly we end up repeating "DEFAULT"):
>
>config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF_DEFAULT
> bool
>
>config BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF
> bool "Disable unprivileged BPF by default"
> default BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF_DEFAULT
>
>Then architectures can select BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF_DEFAULT if they
>wish this to be defaulted to "yes".
Looks like we are settling on unconditional 'default y' for now [1].
I have sent a v3 with 'default y' [2].
>However, please note that this has limited use given that the
>BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF option has been around for a while now. Any
>existing configuration that mentions this symbol will override any
>default specified in the Kconfig files if the option is user-visible.
Yes, existing configurations will have to toggle this manually. However,
many distros already have BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF=y in their
configuration.
>So, IMHO, defaults need to be set correctly from the point in time
>that the option is introduced.
Agree.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/6130e55f-4d84-5ada-4e86-5b678e3eaf5e@iogearbox.net/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0ace9ce3f97656d5f62d11093ad7ee81190c3c25.1635535215.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com/
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