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Date:   Fri, 29 Oct 2021 22:49:09 -0500
From:   ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Liao Chang <liaochang1@...wei.com>
Cc:     <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, <palmer@...belt.com>,
        <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>, <mick@....forth.gr>, <jszhang@...nel.org>,
        <guoren@...ux.alibaba.com>, <penberg@...nel.org>,
        <sunnanyong@...wei.com>, <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
        <changbin.du@...el.com>, <alex@...ti.fr>,
        <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kexec@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode

Liao Chang <liaochang1@...wei.com> writes:

> The pointer to buffer loading kernel binaries is in kernel space for
> kexec_fil mode, When copy_from_user copies data from pointer to a block
> of memory, it checkes that the pointer is in the user space range, on
> RISCV-V that is:
>
> static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
> {
> 	return size <= TASK_SIZE && addr <= TASK_SIZE - size;
> }
>
> and TASK_SIZE is 0x4000000000 for 64-bits, which now causes
> copy_from_user to reject the access of the field 'buf' of struct
> kexec_segment that is in range [CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE,
> CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET), is invalid user space pointer.
>
> This patch fixes this issue by skipping access_ok(), use mempcy() instead.

I am a bit confused.

Why is machine_kexec ever calling copy_from_user?  That seems wrong in
all cases.

Even worse then having a copy_from_user is having data that you don't
know if you should call copy_from_user on.

There is most definitely a bug here.  Can someone please sort it out
without making the kernel guess what kind of memory it is copying from.

Eric



> Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@...wei.com>
> ---
>  arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> index e6eca271a4d6..4a5db856919b 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> @@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
>  		if (image->segment[i].memsz <= sizeof(fdt))
>  			continue;
>  
> -		if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
> +		if (image->file_mode)
> +			memcpy(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt));
> +		else if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
>  			continue;
>  
>  		if (fdt_check_header(&fdt))

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