linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 15/35] ipv6: make exception cache less predictible

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Message-Id: <20211101082455.124162667@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  1 Nov 2021 10:17:27 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Keyu Man <kman001@....edu>, Wei Wang <weiwan@...gle.com>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@...driver.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 15/35] ipv6: make exception cache less predictible

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>

commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 upstream.

Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.

One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.

Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.

After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.

This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.

Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.

Fixes: 35732d01fe31 ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@....edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@...gle.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
[OP: adjusted context for 4.19 stable]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@...driver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 net/ipv6/route.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/route.c
@@ -1454,6 +1454,7 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct r
 	struct rt6_exception_bucket *bucket;
 	struct in6_addr *src_key = NULL;
 	struct rt6_exception *rt6_ex;
+	int max_depth;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&rt6_exception_lock);
@@ -1515,7 +1516,9 @@ static int rt6_insert_exception(struct r
 	bucket->depth++;
 	net->ipv6.rt6_stats->fib_rt_cache++;
 
-	if (bucket->depth > FIB6_MAX_DEPTH)
+	/* Randomize max depth to avoid some side channels attacks. */
+	max_depth = FIB6_MAX_DEPTH + prandom_u32_max(FIB6_MAX_DEPTH);
+	while (bucket->depth > max_depth)
 		rt6_exception_remove_oldest(bucket);
 
 out: