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Message-Id: <20211104012120.729261-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2021 18:21:20 -0700
From: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...aro.org>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...aro.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
io-uring@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
syzbot+6055980d041c8ac23307@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH] io_uring: prevent io_put_identity() from freeing a static identity
Note: this applies to 5.10 stable only. It doesn't trigger on anything
above 5.10 as the code there has been substantially reworked. This also
doesn't apply to any stable kernel below 5.10 afaict.
Syzbot found a bug: KASAN: invalid-free in io_dismantle_req
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=123d9a852fc88ba573ffcb2dbcf4f9576c3b0559
The test submits bunch of io_uring writes and exits, which then triggers
uring_task_cancel() and io_put_identity(), which in some corner cases,
tries to free a static identity. This causes a panic as shown in the
trace below:
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in kfree+0xd5/0x310
CPU: 0 PID: 4618 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.10.76-05281-g4944ec82ebb9-dirty #17
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x1b2/0x21b
print_address_description+0x8d/0x3b0
kasan_report_invalid_free+0x58/0x130
____kasan_slab_free+0x14b/0x170
__kasan_slab_free+0x11/0x20
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcc/0x1a0
kfree+0xd5/0x310
io_dismantle_req+0x9b0/0xd90
io_do_iopoll+0x13a4/0x23e0
io_iopoll_try_reap_events+0x116/0x290
io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0x197d/0x1ee0
io_uring_flush+0x170/0x6d0
filp_close+0xb0/0x150
put_files_struct+0x1d4/0x350
exit_files+0x80/0xa0
do_exit+0x6d9/0x2390
do_group_exit+0x16a/0x2d0
get_signal+0x133e/0x1f80
arch_do_signal+0x7b/0x610
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xaa/0xe0
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Allocated by task 4611:
____kasan_kmalloc+0xcd/0x100
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x208/0x390
io_uring_alloc_task_context+0x57/0x550
io_uring_add_task_file+0x1f7/0x290
io_uring_create+0x2195/0x3490
__x64_sys_io_uring_setup+0x1bf/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810732b500
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
192-byte region [ffff88810732b500, ffff88810732b5c0)
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
This issue bisected to this commit:
commit 186725a80c4e ("io_uring: fix skipping disabling sqo on exec")
Simple reverting the offending commit doesn't work as it hits some
other, related issues like:
/* sqo_dead check is for when this happens after cancellation */
WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->sqo_task == current && !ctx->sqo_dead &&
!xa_load(&tctx->xa, (unsigned long)file));
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5622 at fs/io_uring.c:8960 io_uring_flush+0x5bc/0x6d0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 5622 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.10.76-05281-g4944ec82ebb9-dirty #16
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-6.fc35 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_uring_flush+0x5bc/0x6d0
Call Trace:
filp_close+0xb0/0x150
put_files_struct+0x1d4/0x350
reset_files_struct+0x88/0xa0
bprm_execve+0x7f2/0x9f0
do_execveat_common+0x46f/0x5d0
__x64_sys_execve+0x92/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Changing __io_uring_task_cancel() to call io_disable_sqo_submit() directly,
as the comment suggests, only if __io_uring_files_cancel() is not executed
seems to fix the issue.
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <io-uring@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+6055980d041c8ac23307@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@...aro.org>
---
fs/io_uring.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c
index 0736487165da..fcf9ffe9b209 100644
--- a/fs/io_uring.c
+++ b/fs/io_uring.c
@@ -8882,20 +8882,18 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void)
struct io_uring_task *tctx = current->io_uring;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
s64 inflight;
+ int canceled = 0;
/* make sure overflow events are dropped */
atomic_inc(&tctx->in_idle);
- /* trigger io_disable_sqo_submit() */
- if (tctx->sqpoll)
- __io_uring_files_cancel(NULL);
-
do {
/* read completions before cancelations */
inflight = tctx_inflight(tctx);
if (!inflight)
break;
__io_uring_files_cancel(NULL);
+ canceled = 1;
prepare_to_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
@@ -8909,6 +8907,21 @@ void __io_uring_task_cancel(void)
finish_wait(&tctx->wait, &wait);
} while (1);
+ /*
+ * trigger io_disable_sqo_submit()
+ * if not already done by __io_uring_files_cancel()
+ */
+ if (tctx->sqpoll && !canceled) {
+ struct file *file;
+ unsigned long index;
+
+ xa_for_each(&tctx->xa, index, file) {
+ struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
+
+ io_disable_sqo_submit(ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
atomic_dec(&tctx->in_idle);
io_uring_remove_task_files(tctx);
--
2.33.1
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