linux-kernel - [PATCH v0 06/12] x86/mce: Prevent severity computation from being instrumented

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Message-Id: <20211104144035.20107-7-bp@alien8.de>
Date:   Thu,  4 Nov 2021 15:40:29 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>
Cc:     X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v0 06/12] x86/mce: Prevent severity computation from being instrumented

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>

Mark all the MCE severity computation logic noinstr and allow
instrumentation when it "calls out".

Fixes

  vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0xc5d: call to mce_severity() leaves .noinstr.text section

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index 00e97ebbd94a..03543765e9bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -263,24 +263,35 @@ static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
  * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one
  * taken in the kernel.
  */
-static int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	int fixup_type;
+	bool copy_user;
+
 	if ((m->cs & 3) == 3)
 		return IN_USER;
+
 	if (!mc_recoverable(m->mcgstatus))
 		return IN_KERNEL;
 
-	switch (ex_get_fixup_type(m->ip)) {
+	instrumentation_begin();
+	fixup_type = ex_get_fixup_type(m->ip);
+	copy_user  = is_copy_from_user(regs);
+	instrumentation_end();
+
+	switch (fixup_type) {
 	case EX_TYPE_UACCESS:
 	case EX_TYPE_COPY:
-		if (!regs || !is_copy_from_user(regs))
+		if (!regs || !copy_user)
 			return IN_KERNEL;
 		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
 		fallthrough;
+
 	case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
 	case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
 		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
 		return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+
 	default:
 		return IN_KERNEL;
 	}
@@ -315,8 +326,8 @@ static int mce_severity_amd_smca(struct mce *m, enum context err_ctx)
  * See AMD Error Scope Hierarchy table in a newer BKDG. For example
  * 49125_15h_Models_30h-3Fh_BKDG.pdf, section "RAS Features"
  */
-static int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant,
-			    char **msg, bool is_excp)
+static noinstr int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant,
+				    char **msg, bool is_excp)
 {
 	enum context ctx = error_context(m, regs);
 
@@ -368,8 +379,8 @@ static int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant,
 	return MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY;
 }
 
-static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs,
-			      int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp)
+static noinstr int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs,
+				      int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_excp)
 {
 	enum exception excp = (is_excp ? EXCP_CONTEXT : NO_EXCP);
 	enum context ctx = error_context(m, regs);
@@ -405,8 +416,8 @@ static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs,
 	}
 }
 
-int mce_severity(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant, char **msg,
-		 bool is_excp)
+int noinstr mce_severity(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, int tolerant, char **msg,
+			 bool is_excp)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
-- 
2.29.2