linux-kernel - [PATCH V5 01/50] x86/entry: Add fence for kernel entry swapgs in paranoid

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Message-Id: <20211110115736.3776-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 10 Nov 2021 19:56:47 +0800
From:   Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        "Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: [PATCH V5 01/50] x86/entry: Add fence for kernel entry swapgs in paranoid_entry()

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>

Commit 18ec54fdd6d18 ("x86/speculation: Prepare entry code for Spectre
v1 swapgs mitigations") adds FENCE_SWAPGS_{KERNEL|USER}_ENTRY
for conditional swapgs.  And in paranoid_entry(), it uses only
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for both branches.  It is because the fence
is required for both cases since the CR3 write is conditinal even PTI
is enabled.

But commit 96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in
paranoid entry") switches the code order and changes the branches.
And it misses the needed FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY for user gsbase case.

Add it back by moving FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY up to cover both branches.

Fixes: Commit 96b2371413e8f ("x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry")
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@...el.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index e38a4cf795d9..14ffe12807ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -888,6 +888,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
 	ret
 
 .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
+	/*
+	 * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
+	 * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case.  So do an lfence
+	 * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
+	 */
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+
 	/* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
 	movl	$1, %ebx
 	/*
@@ -903,13 +910,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
 .Lparanoid_entry_swapgs:
 	swapgs
 
-	/*
-	 * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
-	 * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case.  So do an lfence
-	 * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
-	 */
-	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
-
 	/* EBX = 0 -> SWAPGS required on exit */
 	xorl	%ebx, %ebx
 	ret
-- 
2.19.1.6.gb485710b