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Message-ID: <20211112132326.GA16071@MiWiFi-R3L-srv>
Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 21:23:26 +0800
From: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Linux MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] proc/vmcore: fix clearing user buffer by properly
using clear_user()
On 11/12/21 at 10:08am, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > > "that allows supervisor mode programs to optionally set user-space
> > > memory mappings so that access to those mappings from supervisor mode
> > > will cause a trap. This makes it harder for malicious programs to
> > > "trick" the kernel into using instructions or data from a user-space
> > > program"
> >
> > OK, probably. I thought it's triggered in access_ok(), and tried to
> > figure out why. But seems we should do something to check this in
> > access_ok(), otherwise the logic of clear_user/_clear_user is not so
> > reasonable. Anyway, I have learned it, thanks a lot for digging it out.
> >
> > By the way, I can't open above wiki article, found below commit from
> > hpa. Maybe we can add some into log to tell this, not strong opinin,
> > leave it to you.
>
> Yes, now that we know the root cause I'll add some more details to the
> patch description and resend -- thanks Baoquan!
Thanks for sending v2.
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