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Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 18:00:02 +0000
From: Jane Chu <jane.chu@...cle.com>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...hat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
david <david@...morbit.com>,
"Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@...nel.org>,
Vishal L Verma <vishal.l.verma@...el.com>,
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@...el.com>,
Alasdair Kergon <agk@...hat.com>,
device-mapper development <dm-devel@...hat.com>,
"Weiny, Ira" <ira.weiny@...el.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux NVDIMM <nvdimm@...ts.linux.dev>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-xfs <linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] dax,pmem: Implement pmem based dax data recovery
On 11/12/2021 7:36 AM, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 10 2021 at 1:26P -0500,
> Jane Chu <jane.chu@...cle.com> wrote:
>
>> On 11/9/2021 1:02 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 11:59 AM Jane Chu <jane.chu@...cle.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 11/9/2021 10:48 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 11:27 PM Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Fri, Nov 05, 2021 at 07:16:38PM -0600, Jane Chu wrote:
>>>>>>> static size_t pmem_copy_from_iter(struct dax_device *dax_dev, pgoff_t pgoff,
>>>>>>> void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i, int mode)
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>> + phys_addr_t pmem_off;
>>>>>>> + size_t len, lead_off;
>>>>>>> + struct pmem_device *pmem = dax_get_private(dax_dev);
>>>>>>> + struct device *dev = pmem->bb.dev;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (unlikely(mode == DAX_OP_RECOVERY)) {
>>>>>>> + lead_off = (unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
>>>>>>> + len = PFN_PHYS(PFN_UP(lead_off + bytes));
>>>>>>> + if (is_bad_pmem(&pmem->bb, PFN_PHYS(pgoff) / 512, len)) {
>>>>>>> + if (lead_off || !(PAGE_ALIGNED(bytes))) {
>>>>>>> + dev_warn(dev, "Found poison, but addr(%p) and/or bytes(%#lx) not page aligned\n",
>>>>>>> + addr, bytes);
>>>>>>> + return (size_t) -EIO;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> + pmem_off = PFN_PHYS(pgoff) + pmem->data_offset;
>>>>>>> + if (pmem_clear_poison(pmem, pmem_off, bytes) !=
>>>>>>> + BLK_STS_OK)
>>>>>>> + return (size_t) -EIO;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is in the wrong spot. As seen in my WIP series individual drivers
>>>>>> really should not hook into copying to and from the iter, because it
>>>>>> really is just one way to write to a nvdimm. How would dm-writecache
>>>>>> clear the errors with this scheme?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So IMHO going back to the separate recovery method as in your previous
>>>>>> patch really is the way to go. If/when the 64-bit store happens we
>>>>>> need to figure out a good way to clear the bad block list for that.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think we just make error management a first class citizen of a
>>>>> dax-device and stop abstracting it behind a driver callback. That way
>>>>> the driver that registers the dax-device can optionally register error
>>>>> management as well. Then fsdax path can do:
>>>>>
>>>>> rc = dax_direct_access(..., &kaddr, ...);
>>>>> if (unlikely(rc)) {
>>>>> kaddr = dax_mk_recovery(kaddr);
>>>>
>>>> Sorry, what does dax_mk_recovery(kaddr) do?
>>>
>>> I was thinking this just does the hackery to set a flag bit in the
>>> pointer, something like:
>>>
>>> return (void *) ((unsigned long) kaddr | DAX_RECOVERY)
>>
>> Okay, how about call it dax_prep_recovery()?
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> dax_direct_access(..., &kaddr, ...);
>>>>> return dax_recovery_{read,write}(..., kaddr, ...);
>>>>> }
>>>>> return copy_{mc_to_iter,from_iter_flushcache}(...);
>>>>>
>>>>> Where, the recovery version of dax_direct_access() has the opportunity
>>>>> to change the page permissions / use an alias mapping for the access,
>>>>
>>>> again, sorry, what 'page permissions'? memory_failure_dev_pagemap()
>>>> changes the poisoned page mem_type from 'rw' to 'uc-' (should be NP?),
>>>> do you mean to reverse the change?
>>>
>>> Right, the result of the conversation with Boris is that
>>> memory_failure() should mark the page as NP in call cases, so
>>> dax_direct_access() needs to create a UC mapping and
>>> dax_recover_{read,write}() would sink that operation and either return
>>> the page to NP after the access completes, or convert it to WB if the
>>> operation cleared the error.
>>
>> Okay, will add a patch to fix set_mce_nospec().
>>
>> How about moving set_memory_uc() and set_memory_np() down to
>> dax_recovery_read(), so that we don't split the set_memory_X calls
>> over different APIs, because we can't enforce what follows
>> dax_direct_access()?
>>
>>>
>>>>> dax_recovery_read() allows reading the good cachelines out of a
>>>>> poisoned page, and dax_recovery_write() coordinates error list
>>>>> management and returning a poison page to full write-back caching
>>>>> operation when no more poisoned cacheline are detected in the page.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How about to introduce 3 dax_recover_ APIs:
>>>> dax_recover_direct_access(): similar to dax_direct_access except
>>>> it ignores error list and return the kaddr, and hence is also
>>>> optional, exported by device driver that has the ability to
>>>> detect error;
>>>> dax_recovery_read(): optional, supported by pmem driver only,
>>>> reads as much data as possible up to the poisoned page;
>>>
>>> It wouldn't be a property of the pmem driver, I expect it would be a
>>> flag on the dax device whether to attempt recovery or not. I.e. get
>>> away from this being a pmem callback and make this a native capability
>>> of a dax device.
>>>
>>>> dax_recovery_write(): optional, supported by pmem driver only,
>>>> first clear-poison, then write.
>>>>
>>>> Should we worry about the dm targets?
>>>
>>> The dm targets after Christoph's conversion should be able to do all
>>> the translation at direct access time and then dax_recovery_X can be
>>> done on the resulting already translated kaddr.
>>
>> I'm thinking about the mixed device dm where some provides
>> dax_recovery_X, others don't, in which case we don't allow
>> dax recovery because that causes confusion? or should we still
>> allow recovery for part of the mixed devices?
>
> I really don't like the all or nothing approach if it can be avoided.
> I would imagine that if recovery possible it best to support it even
> if the DM device happens to span a mix of devices with varying support
> for recovery.
Got it!
thanks!
-jane
>
> Thanks,
> Mike
>
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