linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 10/11] KVM: Disallow read-only memory for x86 TDX

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Message-ID: <33598dac-d91c-c9b8-4f70-b3a0f9f20c23@intel.com>
Date:   Sun, 14 Nov 2021 11:43:06 +0800
From:   Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, erdemaktas@...gle.com,
        Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        isaku.yamahata@...el.com, Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/11] KVM: Disallow read-only memory for x86 TDX

On 11/13/2021 12:52 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 12, 2021, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
>>
>> TDX doesn't expose permission bits to the VMM in the SEPT tables, i.e.,
>> doesn't support read-only private memory.
>>
>> Introduce kvm_arch_support_readonly_mem(), which returns true except for
>> x86. x86 has its own implementation based on vm_type that returns faluse
>> for TDX VM.
>>
>> Propagate it to KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM to allow reporting on a per-VM
>> basis.
> 
> Assuming KVM gains support for private memslots (or memslots that _may_ be mapped
> private), this is incorrect, the restriction on read-only memory only applies to
> private memory.  Userspace should still be allowed to create read-only shared memory.
> Ditto for dirty-logging in the next patch.

Yes. I had the same concern before sending it out. :)
But I forgot to mention it.

> When this patch was originally created, it was "correct" because there was no
> (proposed) concept of a private memslot or of a memslot that can be mapped private.
> 
> So these two patches at least need to wait until KVM has a defind ABI for managing
> guest private memory.
> 

I'll drop the two patches for next submission.