linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS

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Message-ID: <da032e9f-0b95-f517-6e3c-647668fd823f@acm.org>
Date:   Mon, 15 Nov 2021 10:40:00 -0800
From:   Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>
To:     Alistair Delva <adelva@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@...gle.com>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com,
        stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT

On 11/15/21 10:16 AM, Alistair Delva wrote:
> Booting to Android userspace on 5.14 or newer triggers the following
> SELinux denial:
> 
> avc: denied { sys_nice } for comm="init" capability=23
>       scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:r:init:s0 tclass=capability
>       permissive=0
> 
> Init is PID 0 running as root, so it already has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. For
> better compatibility with older SEPolicy, check ADMIN before NICE.
> 
> Fixes: 9d3a39a5f1e4 ("block: grant IOPRIO_CLASS_RT to CAP_SYS_NICE")
> Signed-off-by: Alistair Delva <adelva@...gle.com>
> Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@...gle.com>
> Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> Cc: selinux@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: kernel-team@...roid.com
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v5.14+
> ---
> v2: added comment requested by Jens
>   block/ioprio.c | 9 ++++++++-
>   1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/block/ioprio.c b/block/ioprio.c
> index 0e4ff245f2bf..313c14a70bbd 100644
> --- a/block/ioprio.c
> +++ b/block/ioprio.c
> @@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
>   
>   	switch (class) {
>   		case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
> -			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> +			/*
> +			 * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> +			 * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
> +			 * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
> +			 * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
> +			 * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
> +			 */
> +			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
>   				return -EPERM;
>   			fallthrough;
>   			/* rt has prio field too */
> 

Are there any other SELinux policies (Fedora?) that need to be verified?

Anyway:

Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>