Message-ID: <CAMkAt6qDsBQuiJ=yv6LO7Whr9ododJ=kr-vKh+7U_yg_TLaDRA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 15 Nov 2021 10:42:12 -0700
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
Cc:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Thomas.Lendacky@....com,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 4/4] crypto: ccp - Add SEV_INIT_EX support

On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 4:50 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
>
>
> On 11/12/21 5:44 PM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 12, 2021 at 4:39 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11/12/21 10:55 AM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 8:32 AM Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com> wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 3:20 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 11/9/21 2:46 PM, Peter Gonda wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 1:26 PM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 09, 2021, Peter Gonda wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 9, 2021 at 10:21 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> There's no need for this to be a function pointer, and the duplicate code can be
> >>>>>>>>> consolidated.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> static int sev_do_init_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *error)
> >>>>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>>>          if (sev_es_tmr) {
> >>>>>>>>>                  /*
> >>>>>>>>>                   * Do not include the encryption mask on the physical
> >>>>>>>>>                   * address of the TMR (firmware should clear it anyway).
> >>>>>>>>>                   */
> >>>>>>>>>                  data.flags |= SEV_INIT_FLAGS_SEV_ES;
> >>>>>>>>>                  data.tmr_address = __pa(sev_es_tmr);
> >>>>>>>>>                  data.tmr_len = SEV_ES_TMR_SIZE;
> >>>>>>>>>          }
> >>>>>>>>>          return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error);
> >>>>>>>>> }
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> static int __sev_init_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>>>          struct sev_data_init data;
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>          memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> >>>>>>>>>          return sev_do_init_locked(cmd, &data, error);
> >>>>>>>>> }
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> static int __sev_init_ex_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>>>> {
> >>>>>>>>>          struct sev_data_init_ex data;
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>          memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
> >>>>>>>>>          data.length = sizeof(data);
> >>>>>>>>>          data.nv_address = __psp_pa(sev_init_ex_nv_address);
> >>>>>>>>>          data.nv_len = NV_LENGTH;
> >>>>>>>>>          return sev_do_init_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT_EX, &data, error);
> >>>>>>>>> }
> >>>>>>>> I am missing how this removes the duplication of the retry code,
> >>>>>>>> parameter checking, and other error checking code.. With what you have
> >>>>>>>> typed out I would assume I still need to function pointer between
> >>>>>>>> __sev_init_ex_locked and __sev_init_locked. Can you please elaborate
> >>>>>>>> here?
> >>>>>>> Hmm.  Ah, I got distracted between the original thought, the realization that
> >>>>>>> the two commands used different structs, and typing up the above.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Also is there some reason the function pointer is not acceptable?
> >>>>>>> It's not unacceptable, it would just be nice to avoid, assuming the alternative
> >>>>>>> is cleaner.  But I don't think any alternative is cleaner, since as you pointed
> >>>>>>> out the above is a half-baked thought.
> >>>>>> OK I'll leave as is.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> +     rc = init_function(error);
> >>>>>>>>>>        if (rc && *error == SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID) {
> >>>>>>>>>>                /*
> >>>>>>>>>>                 * INIT command returned an integrity check failure
> >>>>>>>>>> @@ -286,8 +423,8 @@ static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> >>>>>>>>>>                 * failed and persistent state has been erased.
> >>>>>>>>>>                 * Retrying INIT command here should succeed.
> >>>>>>>>>>                 */
> >>>>>>>>>> -             dev_dbg(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command");
> >>>>>>>>>> -             rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &data, error);
> >>>>>>>>>> +             dev_notice(sev->dev, "SEV: retrying INIT command");
> >>>>>>>>>> +             rc = init_function(error);
> >>>>>>>>> The above comment says "persistent state has been erased", but __sev_do_cmd_locked()
> >>>>>>>>> only writes back to the file if a relevant command was successful, which means
> >>>>>>>>> that rereading the userspace file in __sev_init_ex_locked() will retry INIT_EX
> >>>>>>>>> with the same garbage data.
> >>>>>>>> Ack my mistake, that comment is stale. I will update it so its correct
> >>>>>>>> for the INIT and INIT_EX flows.
> >>>>>>>>> IMO, the behavior should be to read the file on load and then use the kernel buffer
> >>>>>>>>> without ever reloading (unless this is built as a module and is unloaded and reloaded).
> >>>>>>>>> The writeback then becomes opportunistic in the sense that if it fails for some reason,
> >>>>>>>>> the kernel's internal state isn't blasted away.
> >>>>>>>> One issue here is that the file read can fail on load so we use the
> >>>>>>>> late retry to guarantee we can read the file.
> >>>>>>> But why continue loading if reading the file fails on load?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The other point seems like preference. Users may wish to shutdown the PSP FW,
> >>>>>>>> load a new file, and INIT_EX again with that new data. Why should we preclude
> >>>>>>>> them from that functionality?
> >>>>>>> I don't think we should preclude that functionality, but it needs to be explicitly
> >>>>>>> tied to a userspace action, e.g. either on module load or on writing the param to
> >>>>>>> change the path.  If the latter is allowed, then it needs to be denied if the PSP
> >>>>>>> is initialized, otherwise the kernel will be in a non-coherent state and AFAICT
> >>>>>>> userspace will have a heck of a time even understanding what state has been used
> >>>>>>> to initialize the PSP.
> >>>>>> If this driver is builtin the filesystem will be unavailable during
> >>>>>> __init. Using the existing retries already built into
> >>>>>> sev_platform_init() also the file to be read once userspace is
> >>>>>> running, meaning the file system is usable. As I tried to explain in
> >>>>>> the commit message. We could remove the sev_platform_init call during
> >>>>>> sev_pci_init since this only actually needs to be initialized when the
> >>>>>> first command requiring it is issues (either reading some keys/certs
> >>>>>> from the PSP or launching an SEV guest). Then userspace in both the
> >>>>>> builtin and module usage would know running one of those commands
> >>>>>> cause the file to be read for PSP usage. Tom any thoughts on this?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> One thing to note is that if we do the INIT on the first command then
> >>>>> the first guest launch will take a longer. The init command is not
> >>>>> cheap (especially with the SNP, it may take a longer because it has to
> >>>>> do all those RMP setup etc). IIRC, in my early SEV series in I was doing
> >>>>> the INIT during the first command execution and based on the
> >>>>> recommendation moved to do the init on probe.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Should we add a module param to control whether to do INIT on probe or
> >>>>> delay until the first command ?
> >>>> Thats a good point Brijesh. I've only been testing this with SEV and
> >>>> ES so haven't noticed that long setup time. I like the idea of a
> >>>> module parameter to decide when to INIT, that should satisfy Sean's
> >>>> concern that the user doesn't know when the INIT_EX file would be read
> >>>> and that there is extra retry code (duplicated between sev_pci_init
> >>>> and all the PSP commands). I'll get started on that.
> >>> I need a little guidance on how to proceed with this. Should I have
> >>> the new module parameter 'psp_init_on_probe' just disable PSP init on
> >>> module init if false. Or should it also disable PSP init during
> >>> command flow if it's true?
> >>>
> >>> I was thinking I should just have 'psp_init_on_probe' default to true,
> >>> and if false it stops the PSP init during sev_pci_init(). If I add the
> >>> second change that seems like it changes the ABI. Thoughts?
> >>>
> >> Good point that a module params may break the ABI. How about if we add a
> >> new ioctl that can be used to initialize the SEV_INIT_EX. The ioctl
> >> implementation will be similar to the PLATFORM_RESET; it will shutdown
> >> the firmware then call INIT_EX. A platform provisioning tool may use ioctl.
> > Would just a 'skip_psp_init_on_probe' parameter be simpler. We default
> > to false but if users set it, we can skip that init attempt in
> > sev_pci_init(). The init attempts on all other commands that require
> > the INIT state would then provide users with INIT_EX functionality.
> > They would also know exactly when INIT or INIT_EX would be attempted
> > based on the parameter.
>
> Yes, I think that option is also acceptable. Because we are requiring
> the user to explicitly say that it does not want to INIT on boot.

OK sent out a V4 with this mode param approach.

>
>
> >
> > Otherwise a new ioctl sounds reasonable.
> >> -Brijesh
> >>

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