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Message-ID: <YZOrziJfGWHnBh++@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 14:02:06 +0100
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
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Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
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Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
Hypervisor Support
On Mon, Nov 15, 2021 at 06:26:16PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> No, because as Andy pointed out, host userspace must already guard against a bad
> GPA, i.e. this is just a variant of the guest telling the host to DMA to a GPA
> that is completely bogus. The shared vs. private behavior just means that when
> host userspace is doing a GPA=>HVA lookup, it needs to incorporate the "shared"
> state of the GPA. If the host goes and DMAs into the completely wrong HVA=>PFN,
> then that is a host bug; that the bug happened to be exploited by a buggy/malicious
> guest doesn't change the fact that the host messed up.
The thing is that the usual checking mechanisms can't be applied to
guest-private pages. For user-space the GPA is valid if it fits into the
guest memory layout user-space set up before. But whether a page is
shared or private is the guests business. And without an expensive
reporting/query mechanism user-space doesn't have the information to do
the check.
A mechanism to lock pages to shared is also needed, and that creates the
next problems:
* Who can release the lock, only the process which created it or
anyone who has the memory mapped?
* What happens when a process has locked guest regions and then
dies with SIGSEGV, will its locks on guest memory be released
stay around forever?
And this is only what comes to mind immediatly, I sure there are more
problematic details in such an interface.
Regards,
--
Jörg Rödel
jroedel@...e.de
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH
Maxfeldstr. 5
90409 Nürnberg
Germany
(HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg)
Geschäftsführer: Ivo Totev
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