linux-kernel - Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] [PATCH v2 0/2] Introduce the pkill_on

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Message-ID: <d751a5dd17550b21f890e3efcf70d5228451767d.camel@HansenPartnership.com>
Date:   Tue, 16 Nov 2021 08:20:57 -0500
From:   James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
To:     Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
        Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
Cc:     Gabriele Paoloni <gpaoloni@...hat.com>,
        Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@...il.com>,
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Subject: Re: [ELISA Safety Architecture WG] [PATCH v2 0/2] Introduce the
 pkill_on_warn parameter

On Tue, 2021-11-16 at 09:41 +0100, Petr Mladek wrote:
[...]
> If I wanted to implement a super-reliable panic() I would
> use some external device that would cause power-reset when
> the watched device is not responding.

They're called watchdog timers.  We have a whole subsystem full of
them:

drivers/watchdog

We used them in old cluster HA systems to guarantee successful recovery
of shared state from contaminated cluster members, but I think they'd
serve the reliable panic need equally well.  Most server class systems
today have them built in (on the BMC if they don't have a separate
mechanism), they're just not usually activated.

James