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Message-ID: <20211116175225.GB2656760@nvidia.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 13:52:25 -0400
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...dia.com>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>,
Dennis Dalessandro <dennis.dalessandro@...nelisnetworks.com>,
Gal Pressman <galpress@...zon.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH rdma-rc] RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before
forwarding to the driver
On Thu, Nov 11, 2021 at 01:45:00PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
>
> Preset both receive and send CQ pointers prior to call to the drivers and
> overwrite it later again till the mlx4 is going to be changed do not overwrite
> ibqp properties.
>
> This change is needed for mlx5, because in case of QP creation failure,
> it will go to the path of QP destroy which relies on proper CQ pointers.
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
> Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880064c55c0 by task a.out/246
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.15.0+ #291
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
> print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
> ? create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
> kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
> ? create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
> create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib]
> ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
> ? __might_fault+0x8f/0x160
> ? lock_is_held_type+0x98/0x110
> ? _create_user_qp.constprop.0+0x18a0/0x18a0 [mlx5_ib]
> ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
> ? __module_address.part.0+0x25/0x300
> ? is_kernel_percpu_address+0x7d/0x100
> ? static_obj+0x8a/0xc0
> ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x2c3/0x780
> ? __raw_spin_lock_init+0x3b/0x110
> mlx5_ib_create_qp+0x358/0x28a0 [mlx5_ib]
> ? create_qp+0xc210/0xc210 [mlx5_ib]
> ? __module_address.part.0+0x25/0x300
> create_qp.part.0+0x45b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
> ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
> ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
> ? _uverbs_copy_from+0x120/0x120 [ib_uverbs]
> ? lock_downgrade+0x6d0/0x6d0
> ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
> ? __might_fault+0x8f/0x160
> ? ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler+0x120/0x120 [ib_uverbs]
> ? uverbs_fill_udata+0x103/0x510 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
> ? _uverbs_copy_from+0x120/0x120 [ib_uverbs]
> ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
> ? unwind_get_return_address+0x56/0xa0
> ? xfer_to_guest_mode_handle_work+0xd0/0xd0
> ? uverbs_fill_udata+0x510/0x510 [ib_uverbs]
> ? __lock_acquire+0xbec/0x5a40
> ? kmem_cache_free+0xb1/0x2e0
> ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e0/0x3e0
> ? kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
> ? lock_acquire+0x1a9/0x4a0
> ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x11e/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> ? __might_fault+0xba/0x160
> ? lock_release+0x6c0/0x6c0
> ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x19c/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x11e/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> ? ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x3150/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
> ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x78/0x1b0
> ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x32/0x120
> ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x78/0x1b0
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
> ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
> ? do_sys_openat2+0x10a/0x400
> ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9f0/0x9f0
> ? do_sys_openat2+0x10a/0x400
> ? build_open_flags+0x450/0x450
> ? vfs_write+0x470/0x8e0
> ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
> ? __x64_sys_open+0x1a0/0x1a0
> ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
> ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50
> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
> RIP: 0033:0x7fdafc4f2e0d
> Code: c8 0c 00 0f 05 eb a9 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 3b 80 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007ffc1e7ee158 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000402b40 RCX: 00007fdafc4f2e0d
> RDX: 0000000020000980 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 00007ffc1e7ee170 R08: 00007ffc1e7ee260 R09: 00007ffc1e7ee260
> R10: 00007ffc1e7ee260 R11: 0000000000000286 R12: 0000000000401050
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
>
> Allocated by task 246:
> kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xd0
> create_qp.part.0+0x92/0x6a0 [ib_core]
> ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
> ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> Freed by task 246:
> kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
> kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
> __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x150
> slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb4/0x1b0
> kfree+0xe7/0x2a0
> create_qp.part.0+0x52b/0x6a0 [ib_core]
> ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core]
> ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs]
> ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs]
> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0
> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> Last potentially related work creation:
> kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> kasan_record_aux_stack+0xc7/0xd0
> insert_work+0x44/0x280
> __queue_work+0x4e3/0xd30
> queue_work_on+0x69/0x80
> tty_release_struct+0xa6/0xd0
> tty_release+0x9bb/0xef0
> __fput+0x1fe/0x8d0
> task_work_run+0xc5/0x160
> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1d4/0x1e0
> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
> do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> Second to last potentially related work creation:
> kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40
> kasan_record_aux_stack+0xc7/0xd0
> insert_work+0x44/0x280
> __queue_work+0x4e3/0xd30
> queue_work_on+0x69/0x80
> tty_release_struct+0xa6/0xd0
> tty_release+0x9bb/0xef0
> __fput+0x1fe/0x8d0
> task_work_run+0xc5/0x160
> exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1d4/0x1e0
> syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x50
> do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
>
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880064c5000
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
> The buggy address is located 1472 bytes inside of
> 2048-byte region [ffff8880064c5000, ffff8880064c5800)
> The buggy address belongs to the page:
> page:000000006ea34cf4 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x64c0
> head:000000006ea34cf4 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
> flags: 0x4000000000010200(slab|head|zone=1)
> raw: 4000000000010200 ffffea0000571c00 0000000200000002 ffff888005042f00
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff8880064c5480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8880064c5500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> >ffff8880064c5580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ^
> ffff8880064c5600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ffff8880064c5680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ==================================================================
> Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
>
> Fixes: 514aee660df4 ("RDMA: Globally allocate and release QP memory")
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@...dia.com>
> ---
> drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
Applied to for-rc, thanks
Jason
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