linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 11/19] KVM: x86/mmu: Factor shadow_zero_check out of make

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Message-ID: <YZaBSf+bPc69WR1R@google.com>
Date:   Thu, 18 Nov 2021 16:37:29 +0000
From:   Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To:     Ben Gardon <bgardon@...gle.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>, Peter Shier <pshier@...gle.com>,
        David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>,
        Mingwei Zhang <mizhang@...gle.com>,
        Yulei Zhang <yulei.kernel@...il.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <kernellwp@...il.com>,
        Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong.eric@...il.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
        Keqian Zhu <zhukeqian1@...wei.com>,
        David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 11/19] KVM: x86/mmu: Factor shadow_zero_check out of
 make_spte

On Thu, Nov 18, 2021, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Another idea.  The only difference between 5-level and 4-level is that 5-level
> fills in index [4], and I'm pretty sure 4-level doesn't touch that index.  For
> PAE NPT (32-bit SVM), the shadow root level will never change, so that's not an issue.
> 
> Nested NPT is the only case where anything for an EPT/NPT MMU can change, because
> that follows EFER.NX.
> 
> In other words, the non-nested TDP reserved bits don't need to be recalculated
> regardless of level, they can just fill in 5-level and leave it be.
> 
> E.g. something like the below.  The sp->role.direct check could be removed if we
> forced EFER.NX for nested NPT.
> 
> It's a bit ugly in that we'd pass both @kvm and @vcpu, so that needs some more
> thought, but at minimum it means there's no need to recalc the reserved bits.

Ok, I think my final vote is to have the reserved bits passed in, but with the
non-nested TDP reserved bits being computed at MMU init.

I would also prefer to keep the existing make_spte() name so that there's no churn
in those call sites, and to make the relationship between the wrapper, mask_spte(),
and the "real" helper, __make_spte(), more obvious and aligned with the usual
kernel style.

So with the kvm_vcpu_ad_need_write_protect() change and my proposed hack-a-fix for
kvm_x86_get_mt_mask(), the end result would look like:

bool __make_spte(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
		 struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned int pte_access,
		 gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, u64 old_spte, bool prefetch,
		 bool can_unsync, bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte,
		 struct rsvd_bits_validate *shadow_rsvd_bits)
{
	int level = sp->role.level;
	u64 spte = SPTE_MMU_PRESENT_MASK;
	bool wrprot = false;

	if (sp->role.ad_disabled)
		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_DISABLED_MASK;
	else if (kvm_mmu_page_ad_need_write_protect(sp))
		spte |= SPTE_TDP_AD_WRPROT_ONLY_MASK;

	/*
	 * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
	 * supports exec-only page table entries.  In that case,
	 * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
	 * read access.  See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
	 */
	spte |= shadow_present_mask;
	if (!prefetch)
		spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);

	if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) {
		pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
	}

	if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
		spte |= shadow_x_mask;
	else
		spte |= shadow_nx_mask;

	if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
		spte |= shadow_user_mask;

	if (level > PG_LEVEL_4K)
		spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
	if (tdp_enabled)
		spte |= static_call(kvm_x86_get_mt_mask)(kvm, gfn,
			kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));

	if (host_writable)
		spte |= shadow_host_writable_mask;
	else
		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;

	if (!kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn))
		spte |= shadow_me_mask;

	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;

	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask;

		/*
		 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
		 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
		 * is responsibility of kvm_mmu_get_page / kvm_mmu_sync_roots.
		 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
		 */
		if (is_writable_pte(old_spte))
			goto out;

		/*
		 * Unsync shadow pages that are reachable by the new, writable
		 * SPTE.  Write-protect the SPTE if the page can't be unsync'd,
		 * e.g. it's write-tracked (upper-level SPs) or has one or more
		 * shadow pages and unsync'ing pages is not allowed.
		 */
		if (mmu_try_to_unsync_pages(kvm, slot, gfn, can_unsync, prefetch)) {
			pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n",
				 __func__, gfn);
			wrprot = true;
			pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
			spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | shadow_mmu_writable_mask);
		}
	}

	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
		spte |= spte_shadow_dirty_mask(spte);

out:
	if (prefetch)
		spte = mark_spte_for_access_track(spte);

	WARN_ONCE(is_rsvd_spte(shadow_rsvd_bits), spte, level),
		  "spte = 0x%llx, level = %d, rsvd bits = 0x%llx", spte, level,
		  get_rsvd_bits(&shadow_rsvd_bits, spte, level));

	if ((spte & PT_WRITABLE_MASK) && kvm_slot_dirty_track_enabled(slot)) {
		/* Enforced by kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust. */
		WARN_ON(level > PG_LEVEL_4K);
		mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, slot, gfn);
	}

	*new_spte = spte;
	return wrprot;
}

bool make_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp,
	       struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
	       unsigned int pte_access, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
	       u64 old_spte, bool prefetch, bool can_unsync,
	       bool host_writable, u64 *new_spte)
{
	return __make_spte(vcpu->kvm, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, pfn, old_spte,
			   prefetch, can_unsync, host_writable, new_spte,
			   &vcpu->arch.mmu->shadow_zero_check);
}