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Message-ID: <CAG_fn=VN001yOZ_kN3rOENKYvEioRkc0J0ZZYtLKKshK4X2yfg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 11:19:44 +0100
From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
To: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>,
YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@...inois.edu>,
Colin Ian King <colin.king@...onical.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@...nel.org>,
Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@...aro.org>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@...labora.com>,
Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>,
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@...ll.ch>,
Chris Wilson <chris@...is-wilson.co.uk>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>,
Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@....com.cn>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@...ong.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@...gle.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] uaccess-buffer: add core code
On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 10:56 AM Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
>
> .On Tue, 23 Nov 2021 at 06:17, Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > Add the core code to support uaccess logging. Subsequent patches will
> > hook this up to the arch-specific kernel entry and exit code for
> > certain architectures.
>
> I don't see where we block signals when a user writes to the addr. I
> expected to see some get_user from the addr somewhere in the signal
> handling code. What am I missing?
>
> > Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I6581765646501a5631b281d670903945ebadc57d
> > Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@...gle.com>
> > ---
> > v2:
> > - New interface that avoids multiple syscalls per real syscall and
> > is arch-generic
> > - Avoid logging uaccesses done by BPF programs
> > - Add documentation
> > - Split up into multiple patches
> > - Various code moves, renames etc as requested by Marco
> >
> > arch/Kconfig | 5 +
> > fs/exec.c | 2 +
> > include/linux/instrumented.h | 5 +-
> > include/linux/sched.h | 4 +
> > include/linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h | 59 +++++++++++
> > include/linux/uaccess-buffer.h | 79 ++++++++++++++
> > include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 3 +
> > include/uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h | 25 +++++
> > kernel/Makefile | 1 +
> > kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 6 +-
> > kernel/fork.c | 3 +
> > kernel/signal.c | 4 +-
> > kernel/sys.c | 6 ++
> > kernel/uaccess-buffer.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 14 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 include/linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h
> > create mode 100644 include/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > create mode 100644 kernel/uaccess-buffer.c
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> > index 26b8ed11639d..6030298a7e9a 100644
> > --- a/arch/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> > @@ -1302,6 +1302,11 @@ config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH
> > config DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME
> > bool
> >
> > +config HAVE_ARCH_UACCESS_BUFFER
> > + bool
> > + help
> > + Select if the architecture's syscall entry/exit code supports uaccess buffers.
> > +
> > source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
> >
> > source "scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig"
> > diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> > index 537d92c41105..5f30314f3ec6 100644
> > --- a/fs/exec.c
> > +++ b/fs/exec.c
> > @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
> > #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> > #include <linux/io_uring.h>
> > #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> >
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> > @@ -1313,6 +1314,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
> > me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
> >
> > clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
> > + uaccess_buffer_set_descriptor_addr_addr(0);
> >
> > /*
> > * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
> > diff --git a/include/linux/instrumented.h b/include/linux/instrumented.h
> > index 42faebbaa202..c96be1695614 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/instrumented.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/instrumented.h
> > @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
> >
> > /*
> > * This header provides generic wrappers for memory access instrumentation that
> > - * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN.
> > + * the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN, uaccess buffers.
> > */
> > #ifndef _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H
> > #define _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H
> > @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> > #include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
> > #include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
> > #include <linux/types.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h>
> >
> > /**
> > * instrument_read - instrument regular read access
> > @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ instrument_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> > {
> > kasan_check_read(from, n);
> > kcsan_check_read(from, n);
> > + uaccess_buffer_log_write(to, n);
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > @@ -134,6 +136,7 @@ instrument_copy_from_user(const void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long
> > {
> > kasan_check_write(to, n);
> > kcsan_check_write(to, n);
> > + uaccess_buffer_log_read(from, n);
> > }
> >
> > #endif /* _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> > index 78c351e35fec..1f978deaa3f8 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> > @@ -1484,6 +1484,10 @@ struct task_struct {
> > struct callback_head l1d_flush_kill;
> > #endif
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_UACCESS_BUFFER
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info uaccess_buffer;
> > +#endif
>
> Shouldn't this be controlled by an additional config that a user can
> enable/disable?
> If I am reading this correctly, the current implementation forces
> uaccess logging for all arches that support it. Some embed kernels may
> not want this.
>
>
> > /*
> > * New fields for task_struct should be added above here, so that
> > * they are included in the randomized portion of task_struct.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h b/include/linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..bddc84ddce32
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess-buffer-log-hooks.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +#ifndef _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_LOG_HOOKS_H
> > +#define _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_LOG_HOOKS_H
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_UACCESS_BUFFER
> > +
> > +struct uaccess_buffer_info {
> > + /*
> > + * The pointer to pointer to struct uaccess_descriptor. This is the
> > + * value controlled by prctl(PR_SET_UACCESS_DESCRIPTOR_ADDR_ADDR).
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_descriptor __user *__user *desc_ptr_ptr;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The pointer to struct uaccess_descriptor read at syscall entry time.
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_descriptor __user *desc_ptr;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * A pointer to the kernel's temporary copy of the uaccess log for the
> > + * current syscall. We log to a kernel buffer in order to avoid leaking
> > + * timing information to userspace.
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_entry *kbegin;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The position of the next uaccess buffer entry for the current
> > + * syscall.
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_entry *kcur;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * A pointer to the end of the kernel's uaccess log.
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_entry *kend;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * The pointer to the userspace uaccess log, as read from the
> > + * struct uaccess_descriptor.
> > + */
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_entry __user *ubegin;
> > +};
> > +
> > +void uaccess_buffer_log_read(const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
> > +void uaccess_buffer_log_write(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
> > +
> > +#else
> > +
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_log_read(const void __user *from,
> > + unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_log_write(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +#endif /* _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_LOG_HOOKS_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess-buffer.h b/include/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..14261368d3a9
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +#ifndef _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H
> > +#define _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H
> > +
> > +#include <linux/sched.h>
> > +#include <uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> > +
> > +#include <asm-generic/errno-base.h>
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_UACCESS_BUFFER
> > +
> > +static inline bool uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + return tsk->uaccess_buffer.desc_ptr_ptr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_syscall_entry(void);
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_syscall_entry(void)
> > +{
> > + if (uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(current))
> > + __uaccess_buffer_syscall_entry();
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_syscall_exit(void);
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_syscall_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + if (uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(current))
> > + __uaccess_buffer_syscall_exit();
> > +}
> > +
> > +bool __uaccess_buffer_pre_exit_loop(void);
> > +static inline bool uaccess_buffer_pre_exit_loop(void)
> > +{
> > + if (!uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(current))
> > + return false;
> > + return __uaccess_buffer_pre_exit_loop();
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_post_exit_loop(void);
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_post_exit_loop(bool pending)
> > +{
> > + if (pending)
> > + __uaccess_buffer_post_exit_loop();
> > +}
> > +
> > +void uaccess_buffer_cancel_log(struct task_struct *tsk);
> > +int uaccess_buffer_set_descriptor_addr_addr(unsigned long addr);
> > +
> > +#else
> > +
> > +static inline bool uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_syscall_entry(void)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_syscall_exit(void)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +static inline bool uaccess_buffer_pre_exit_loop(void)
> > +{
> > + return false;
> > +}
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_post_exit_loop(bool pending)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +static inline void uaccess_buffer_cancel_log(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline int uaccess_buffer_set_descriptor_addr_addr(unsigned long addr)
> > +{
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > +#endif /* _LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H */
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> > index bb73e9a0b24f..74b37469c7b3 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> > @@ -272,4 +272,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
> > # define PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP 1
> > # define PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP 2
> >
> > +/* Configure uaccess logging feature */
> > +#define PR_SET_UACCESS_DESCRIPTOR_ADDR_ADDR 63
> > +
> > #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h b/include/uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..619b17dc25c4
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/uaccess-buffer.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> > +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H
> > +#define _UAPI_LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H
> > +
> > +/* Location of the uaccess log. */
> > +struct uaccess_descriptor {
> > + /* Address of the uaccess_buffer_entry array. */
> > + __u64 addr;
> > + /* Size of the uaccess_buffer_entry array in number of elements. */
> > + __u64 size;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* Format of the entries in the uaccess log. */
> > +struct uaccess_buffer_entry {
> > + /* Address being accessed. */
> > + __u64 addr;
> > + /* Number of bytes that were accessed. */
> > + __u64 size;
> > + /* UACCESS_BUFFER_* flags. */
> > + __u64 flags;
> > +};
> > +
> > +#define UACCESS_BUFFER_FLAG_WRITE 1 /* access was a write */
> > +
> > +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_UACCESS_BUFFER_H */
> > diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
> > index 186c49582f45..d4d9be5146c3 100644
> > --- a/kernel/Makefile
> > +++ b/kernel/Makefile
> > @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += kcsan/
> > obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) += cfi.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_UACCESS_BUFFER) += uaccess-buffer.o
> >
> > obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > index 649f07623df6..167b50177066 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
> > @@ -637,7 +637,11 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_event_output_data_proto = {
> > BPF_CALL_3(bpf_copy_from_user, void *, dst, u32, size,
> > const void __user *, user_ptr)
> > {
> > - int ret = copy_from_user(dst, user_ptr, size);
> > + /*
> > + * Avoid copy_from_user() here as it may leak information about the BPF
> > + * program to userspace via the uaccess buffer.
> > + */
> > + int ret = raw_copy_from_user(dst, user_ptr, size);
>
> Here I am more concerned about KASAN/KMSAN checks.
> What exactly is the attack vector here? Are these accesses secret?
If there are concerns about leaking information in this particular
case, any other call to copy_from_user() added in the future will be
prone to the same issues.
So if uaccess logging is meant for production use, it should be
possible to lock the feature down from unwanted users.
> Can't the same info be obtained using userfaultfd/unmapping memory?
>
> raw_copy_from_user also skips access_ok, is it ok?
>
>
> > if (unlikely(ret)) {
> > memset(dst, 0, size);
> > diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> > index 3244cc56b697..c7abe7e7c7cd 100644
> > --- a/kernel/fork.c
> > +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> > @@ -96,6 +96,7 @@
> > #include <linux/scs.h>
> > #include <linux/io_uring.h>
> > #include <linux/bpf.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> >
> > #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > @@ -890,6 +891,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
> > if (memcg_charge_kernel_stack(tsk))
> > goto free_stack;
> >
> > + uaccess_buffer_cancel_log(tsk);
>
> Why do we need this?
> tsk is a newly allocated task_struct. If I am not mistaken, it's not
> zero initialized, so are we kfree'ing garbage?
> But we may need to do something with tasks after arch_dup_task_struct.
>
> > stack_vm_area = task_stack_vm_area(tsk);
> >
> > err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
> > diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
> > index a629b11bf3e0..69bf21518bd0 100644
> > --- a/kernel/signal.c
> > +++ b/kernel/signal.c
> > @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
> > #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
> > #include <linux/cgroup.h>
> > #include <linux/audit.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> >
> > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> > #include <trace/events/signal.h>
> > @@ -1031,7 +1032,8 @@ static void complete_signal(int sig, struct task_struct *p, enum pid_type type)
> > if (sig_fatal(p, sig) &&
> > !(signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT) &&
> > !sigismember(&t->real_blocked, sig) &&
> > - (sig == SIGKILL || !p->ptrace)) {
> > + (sig == SIGKILL ||
> > + !(p->ptrace || uaccess_buffer_maybe_blocked(p)))) {
>
> Why do we need this change?
>
> > /*
> > * This signal will be fatal to the whole group.
> > */
> > diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> > index 8fdac0d90504..c71a9a9c0f68 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sys.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> > @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
> > #include <linux/version.h>
> > #include <linux/ctype.h>
> > #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> >
> > #include <linux/compat.h>
> > #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > @@ -2530,6 +2531,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
> > error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
> > break;
> > #endif
> > + case PR_SET_UACCESS_DESCRIPTOR_ADDR_ADDR:
> > + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + error = uaccess_buffer_set_descriptor_addr_addr(arg2);
> > + break;
> > default:
> > error = -EINVAL;
> > break;
> > diff --git a/kernel/uaccess-buffer.c b/kernel/uaccess-buffer.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..e1c6d6ab9af8
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/kernel/uaccess-buffer.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/*
> > + * Support for uaccess logging via uaccess buffers.
> > + *
> > + * Copyright (C) 2021, Google LLC.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <linux/compat.h>
> > +#include <linux/mm.h>
> > +#include <linux/prctl.h>
> > +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
> > +#include <linux/sched.h>
> > +#include <linux/signal.h>
> > +#include <linux/slab.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess-buffer.h>
> > +
> > +static void uaccess_buffer_log(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
> > + unsigned long flags)
> > +{
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info *buf = ¤t->uaccess_buffer;
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_entry *entry = buf->kcur;
> > +
> > + if (!entry || unlikely(uaccess_kernel()))
> > + return;
> > + entry->addr = addr;
> > + entry->size = size;
> > + entry->flags = flags;
> > +
> > + ++buf->kcur;
> > + if (buf->kcur == buf->kend)
> > + buf->kcur = 0;
>
> = NULL;
>
> > +}
> > +
> > +void uaccess_buffer_log_read(const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > + uaccess_buffer_log((unsigned long)from, n, 0);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(uaccess_buffer_log_read);
> > +
> > +void uaccess_buffer_log_write(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
> > +{
> > + uaccess_buffer_log((unsigned long)to, n, UACCESS_BUFFER_FLAG_WRITE);
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(uaccess_buffer_log_write);
> > +
> > +int uaccess_buffer_set_descriptor_addr_addr(unsigned long addr)
> > +{
> > + current->uaccess_buffer.desc_ptr_ptr =
> > + (struct uaccess_descriptor __user * __user *)addr;
> > + uaccess_buffer_cancel_log(current);
>
> Is this necessary? It looks more reasonable and useful to not call
> cancel. In most cases the user won't setup it twice/change. But if the
> user anyhow asked to trace the prctl, why not trace it?
>
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +bool __uaccess_buffer_pre_exit_loop(void)
> > +{
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info *buf = ¤t->uaccess_buffer;
> > + struct uaccess_descriptor __user *desc_ptr;
> > + sigset_t tmp_mask;
> > +
> > + if (get_user(desc_ptr, buf->desc_ptr_ptr) || !desc_ptr)
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + current->real_blocked = current->blocked;
> > + sigfillset(&tmp_mask);
> > + set_current_blocked(&tmp_mask);
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_post_exit_loop(void)
> > +{
> > + spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> > + current->blocked = current->real_blocked;
> > + recalc_sigpending();
> > + spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
> > +}
> > +
> ;> +void uaccess_buffer_cancel_log(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info *buf = &tsk->uaccess_buffer;
> > +
> > + if (buf->kcur) {
>
> uaccess_buffer_log sets kcur to NULL on overflow and we call this
> function from a middle of fork, it looks strange that kfree'ing
> something depends on the previous buffer overflow. Should we check
> kbegin here?
>
> > + buf->kcur = 0;
>
> = NULL
> I would also set kend to NULL to not leave a dangling pointer.
>
> > + kfree(buf->kbegin);
> > + }
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_syscall_entry(void)
> > +{
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info *buf = ¤t->uaccess_buffer;
> > + struct uaccess_descriptor desc;
> > +
> > + if (get_user(buf->desc_ptr, buf->desc_ptr_ptr) || !buf->desc_ptr ||
> > + put_user(0, buf->desc_ptr_ptr) ||
> > + copy_from_user(&desc, buf->desc_ptr, sizeof(desc)))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if (desc.size > 1024)
> > + desc.size = 1024;
> > +
> > + buf->kbegin = kmalloc_array(
> > + desc.size, sizeof(struct uaccess_buffer_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
>
> Is not handling error intentional here?
> Maybe it's better to check the error just to make the code more
> explicit (and maybe prevent some future bugs).
>
> Actually an interesting attack vector. If you can make this kmalloc
> fail, you can prevent sanitizers from detecting any of the bad
> accesses :)
>
> Does it make sense to flag the error somewhere in the desc?... or I am
> thinking if we should pre-allocate the buffer, if we start tracing a
> task, we will trace lots of syscalls, so avoiding kmalloc/kfree per
> syscall can make sense. What do you think?
>
> > + buf->kcur = buf->kbegin;
> > + buf->kend = buf->kbegin + desc.size;
> > + buf->ubegin = (struct uaccess_buffer_entry __user *)desc.addr;
> > +}
> > +
> > +void __uaccess_buffer_syscall_exit(void)
> > +{
> > + struct uaccess_buffer_info *buf = ¤t->uaccess_buffer;
> > + u64 num_entries = buf->kcur - buf->kbegin;
> > + struct uaccess_descriptor desc;
> > +
> > + if (!buf->kcur)
>
> uaccess_buffer_log sets kcur to NULL on overflow. I think we need to
> check kbegin here.
>
>
> > + return;
> > +
> > + desc.addr = (u64)(buf->ubegin + num_entries);
> > + desc.size = buf->kend - buf->kcur;
>
> Is the user expected to use size in any of reasonable scenarios?
> We cap size at 1024 at entry, so the size can be truncated here.
>
> > + buf->kcur = 0;
>
> = NULL
>
> > + if (copy_to_user(buf->ubegin, buf->kbegin,
> > + num_entries * sizeof(struct uaccess_buffer_entry)) == 0)
> > + (void)copy_to_user(buf->desc_ptr, &desc, sizeof(desc));
> > +
> > + kfree(buf->kbegin);
>
> What if we enter exit/exit_group with logging enabled, won't we leak the buffer?
>
> > +}
> > --
> > 2.34.0.rc2.393.gf8c9666880-goog
> >
--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer
Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München
Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Halimah DeLaine Prado
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
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