[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <YZ0WJlv9rxpQ+GVG@zn.tnic>
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2021 17:26:14 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>,
Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
Hypervisor Support
On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 03:36:35PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Kirill posted a few RFCs that did exactly that. It's definitely a viable approach,
> but it's a bit of a dead end,
One thing at a time...
> e.g. doesn't help solve page migration,
AFAICR, that needs a whole explicit and concerted effort with the
migration helper - that was one of the approaches, at least, guest's
explicit involvement, remote attestation and a bunch of other things...
> is limited to struct page
I'm no mm guy so maybe you can elaborate further.
> doesn't capture which KVM guest owns the memory, etc...
So I don't think we need this for the problem at hand. But from the
sound of it, it probably is a good idea to be able to map the guest
owner to the memory anyway.
> https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/
Right, there it is in the last patch.
Hmmkay, so we need some generic machinery which unmaps memory from
the host kernel's pagetables so that it doesn't do any stray/unwanted
accesses to it. I'd look in the direction of mm folks for what to do
exactly, though.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
Powered by blists - more mailing lists