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Message-ID: <CAJ2a_DejJibTyiiA-+A1WbhcyYD17-h+9FuXL5=sCHEs9Qv+BA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 19:34:50 +0100
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@...glemail.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Jari Ruusu <jariruusu@...rs.sourceforge.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Alistair Delva <adelva@...gle.com>,
Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@...gle.com>,
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
SElinux list <selinux@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...roid.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.10 130/154] block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT
On Wed, 24 Nov 2021 at 19:16, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 11:33:11AM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 04:31:22PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 04:22:50PM +0200, Jari Ruusu wrote:
> > > > Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > > From: Alistair Delva <adelva@...gle.com>
> > > > >
> > > > > commit 94c4b4fd25e6c3763941bdec3ad54f2204afa992 upstream.
> > > > [SNIP]
> > > > > --- a/block/ioprio.c
> > > > > +++ b/block/ioprio.c
> > > > > @@ -69,7 +69,14 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)
> > > > >
> > > > > switch (class) {
> > > > > case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT:
> > > > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> > > > > + * which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security
> > > > > + * modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check
> > > > > + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for
> > > > > + * possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission.
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
> > > > > return -EPERM;
> > > > > fallthrough;
> > > > > /* rt has prio field too */
> > > >
> > > > What exactly is above patch trying to fix?
> > > > It does not change control flow at all, and added comment is misleading.
> > >
> > > See the thread on the mailing list for what it does and why it is
> > > needed.
> > >
> > > It does change the result when selinux is enabled.
> > >
> > > thanks,
> > >
> > > greg k-h
> >
> > The case where we create a newer more fine grained capability which is a
> > sub-cap of a broader capability like CAP_SYS_ADMIN is analogous. See
> > check_syslog_permissions() for instance.
> >
> > So I think a helper like
> >
> > int capable_either_or(int cap1, int cap2) {
> > if (has_capability_noaudit(current, cap1))
> > return 0;
> > return capable(cap2);
> > }
> >
> > might be worthwhile.
>
I proposed an early prototype at
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/selinux/patch/20211116112437.43412-1-cgzones@googlemail.com/
> Sure, feel free to work on that and submit it, but for now, this change
> is needed.
>
I would argue this change is not necessary since the actual syscall
still succeeds as this is only an informative avc denial message about
a failed capability check. But this ship has sailed...
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
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