| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-Id: <911210845d863b06de2404acae6fff06241f0458.1637862358.git.msuchanek@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 19:02:41 +0100
From: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
To: keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Nayna <nayna@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, Vasily Gorbik <gor@...ux.ibm.com>,
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@...ux.ibm.com>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ibm.com>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Hari Bathini <hbathini@...ux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@...ux.ibm.com>,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
Frank van der Linden <fllinden@...zon.com>,
Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
Daniel Axtens <dja@...ens.net>, buendgen@...ibm.com,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@...ux.ibm.com>,
Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/6] kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@...e.de>
---
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 21 ++++-----------------
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 21 ++++-----------------
include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++
kernel/module-internal.h | 2 --
kernel/module.c | 4 +++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 24 +++++++++++++++---------
6 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
index 25dc1071feec..266cb26d3ca0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c
@@ -153,12 +153,10 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
+ size_t kernel_len = length;
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
- struct module_signature *ms;
- unsigned long sig_len;
- int ret;
if (marker_len > kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
kernel_len -= marker_len;
- ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
- ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
- kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
- NULL, NULL);
+ return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ "kexec_file");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 43a9abe48abd..432797249db3 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -24,12 +24,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
-int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long length)
{
+ size_t kernel_len = length;
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
- struct module_signature *ms;
- unsigned long sig_len;
- int ret;
/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -43,19 +41,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
kernel_len -= marker_len;
- ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
- ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
- kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
- VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
- NULL, NULL);
+ return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ "kexec_file");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h
index a655923335ae..c1cf0582012a 100644
--- a/include/linux/verification.h
+++ b/include/linux/verification.h
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
enum key_being_used_for usage);
#endif
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len, struct key *trusted_keys,
+ const char *what);
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
--- a/kernel/module-internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module-internal.h
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
} index;
};
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
info->len -= markerlen;
- err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+ err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
if (!err) {
info->sig_ok = true;
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8723ae70ea1f..f492e410564d 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -14,13 +14,19 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
*/
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, size_t *len,
+ struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
{
struct module_signature ms;
- size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+ size_t sig_len, modlen = *len;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -28,18 +34,18 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
return -EBADMSG;
- memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+ memcpy(&ms, data + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
- ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, what);
if (ret)
return ret;
sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
- info->len = modlen;
+ *len = modlen;
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
- VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+ trusted_keys,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
}
--
2.31.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists