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Message-ID: <9503ac53-1323-eade-2863-df11a5f36b6a@amd.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 Nov 2021 08:44:54 -0600
From:   Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
To:     Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     brijesh.singh@....com, Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>,
        x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Sergio Lopez <slp@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@....com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
        marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v5 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP)
 Hypervisor Support



On 11/25/21 4:05 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 24, 2021 at 09:48:14AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> That covers things like copy_from_user().  It does not account for
>> things where kernel mappings are used, like where a
>> get_user_pages()/kmap() is in play.
> 
> The kmap case is guarded by KVM code, which locks the page first so that
> the guest can't change the page state, then checks the page state, and
> if it is shared does the kmap and the access.


The KVM use-case is well covered in the series, but I believe Dave is 
highlighting what if the access happens outside of the KVM driver (such 
as a ptrace() or others).

One possible approach to fix this is to enlighten the kmap/unmap(). 
Basically, move the per page locking mechanism used by the KVM in the 
arch-specific code and have kmap/kunmap() call the arch hooks. The arch 
hooks will do this:

Before the map, check whether the page is added as a shared in the RMP 
table. If not shared, then error.
Acquire a per-page map_lock.
Release the per-page map_lock on the kunmap().

The current patch set provides helpers to change the page from private 
to shared. Enhance the helpers to check for the per-page map_lock, if 
the map_lock is held then do not allow changing the page from shared to 
private.

Thoughts ?

> 
> This should turn an RMP fault in the kernel which is not covered in the
> uaccess exception table into a fatal error.
> 
> Regards,
> 

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