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Message-ID: <9311513.S0ZZtNTvxh@tauon.chronox.de>
Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2021 16:31:59 +0100
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, Tso Ted <tytso@....edu>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@...il.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@...il.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...f.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@...garu.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@...ger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@...hat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@....edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@...shancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@...inter.de>,
Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@....bund.de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@...onical.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@...hat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...ia.fr>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>,
Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@...il.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@...e.cz>,
John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com>,
Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@...lbox.org>,
Jirka Hladky <jhladky@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v43 01/15] Linux Random Number Generator
Am Freitag, 26. November 2021, 17:22:14 CET schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Hi Greg,
> On Fri, Nov 26, 2021 at 05:15:59PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> > Am Freitag, 26. November 2021, 16:44:17 CET schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> >
> > Hi Greg,
> >
> > > On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 09:59:01AM -0500, Simo Sorce wrote:
> > > > Jason,
> > > > have you previously produced a list of reasoned concerns with this
> > > > patchset and direction?
> > > >
> > > > This specific email is not really useful to me to understand the
> > > > concerns as it does not contain actionable suggestion or critique.
> > > >
> > > > I personally find the direction fine, and with my distribution hat on
> > > > I
> > > > can say that FIPS is essential for us and any design must include an
> > > > option to be FIPS certifiable.
> > > >
> > > > As NIST keeps improving their testing capabilities and rigorous
> > > > cryptographic design of the CSPRNGs as well as entropy sources the
> > > > kernel must also adapt.
> > > >
> > > > Stephan is providing a path forward, and I haven't seen any other
> > > > proposal, let alone code, that provide improvements in this area.
> > > > I am pretty sure the design can be improved if there is detailed and
> > > > actionable feedback on what to change.
> > > >
> > > > I hope the path forward can be one of collaboration rather then mere
> > > > opposition.
> > >
> > > Replacement of the existing code to cut over to the new one is not
> > > collaboration, it's the exact opposite.
> > >
> > > Submitting patches to the existing codebase to implement the
> > > "requirements" is the proper way forward, why has that never been done.
> >
> > It has been attempted by Nikolai Stange without avail - no comments were
> > received, let alone it was integrated.
>
> Links to the patches and discussion please?
Please consider https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/9/21/157
One side note: the LRNG patch set does not replace random.c, but provides an
additional implementation that can be selected at compile time. I am under the
impression that is an equal approach considering other areas of the kernel
like file systems, memory allocators, and similar.
Thanks
Stephan
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