linux-kernel - Re: [RFC 17/20] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability

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Message-ID: <82f874dc0cd580e12162b599f38d22ae8148620d.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu, 02 Dec 2021 07:33:01 -0500
From:   James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@...wei.com>,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Cc:     "zohar@...ux.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "christian.brauner@...ntu.com" <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
        "containers@...ts.linux.dev" <containers@...ts.linux.dev>,
        "dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com" <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
        "ebiederm@...ssion.com" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com>,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
        "mpeters@...hat.com" <mpeters@...hat.com>,
        "lhinds@...hat.com" <lhinds@...hat.com>,
        "lsturman@...hat.com" <lsturman@...hat.com>,
        "puiterwi@...hat.com" <puiterwi@...hat.com>,
        "jamjoom@...ibm.com" <jamjoom@...ibm.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "paul@...l-moore.com" <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        "rgb@...hat.com" <rgb@...hat.com>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 17/20] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check
 corresponding capability

On Thu, 2021-12-02 at 07:16 +0000, Denis Semakin wrote:
> Obviously the main goal by adding new capability was to avoid the
> using CAP_SYS_ADMIN (IOW superuser)

OK, but as I've said a couple of times now: the check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
doesn't have to be monolithic like this.  We have two sets of checks in
the kernel: capable(..., CAP_SYS_ADMIN) which is for the global
monolithic root like capability and ns_capable(..., CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
which is for the owner (possibly unprivileged) of the user namespace.

This gives us a way of parsing out admin capabilites into the small
subset that the user namespace needs.  Patch 16 changed the check from
capable to ns_capable, meaning it's no longer the monolithic
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

> to manage IMA stuff, that was also about security granularity.  It's
> good if CAP_MAC_ADMIN will be enough for doing IMA related things
> (write policies and extended attributes).

To be honest, as long as the check resolves to ns_capable(...,
CAP_SYS_<SOMETHING>) I'm not that bothered because the owner of the
user namespace will still pass the check.

> But for me it's a little bit unclear how to deal with unprivileged
> users: assuming there's no CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN but CAP_MAC_ADMIN was
> set up, so in this case user can control any LSM (seLinux, SMACK,
> etc) and IMA (policies, xattrs). What if .. for some systems there
> would be some requirements that will allow to touch LSM but do not
> change any IMA (integrity) things? A user can set up any IMA policy
> (it's about the system integrity), modify IMA related xattrs but it's
> forbidden to change seLinux policies and e.g. SMACK labels... May be
> it's unreal scenario of course... but I guess it's not 100%
> impossible.

This is why looking at it as a switch from capable to ns_capable is
useful: an ordinary user can assume ns_capable(..., CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
powers arbitrarily, so its a significant check on where you can make
the switch.

James