linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <db9b7bc9-fdca-4dd2-2c3f-3b7354c165bb@kernel.org>
Date:   Fri, 3 Dec 2021 11:28:04 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, jarkko@...nel.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
        bp@...en8.de, mingo@...hat.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        x86@...nel.org
Cc:     seanjc@...gle.com, kai.huang@...el.com, cathy.zhang@...el.com,
        cedric.xing@...el.com, haitao.huang@...el.com,
        mark.shanahan@...el.com, hpa@...or.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/25] x86/sgx: Introduce runtime protection bits

On 12/1/21 11:23, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Enclave creators declare their paging permission intent at the time
> the pages are added to the enclave. These paging permissions are
> vetted when pages are added to the enclave and stashed off
> (in sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits) for later comparison with
> enclave PTEs.
> 

I'm a bit confused here. ENCLU[EMODPE] allows the enclave to change the 
EPCM permission bits however it likes with no oversight from the kernel. 
  So we end up with a whole bunch of permission masks:

The PTE: controlled by complex kernel policy

The VMA: with your series, this is entirely controlled by userspace.  I 
think I'm fine with that.

vm_max_prot_bits: populated from secinfo at setup time, unless I missed 
something that changes it later.  Maybe I'm confused or missed something 
in one of the patches,

vm_run_prot_bits: populated from some combination of ioctls.  I'm 
entirely lost as to what this is for.

EPCM bits: controlled by the guest.  basically useless for any host 
purpose on SGX2 hardware (with or without kernel support -- the enclave 
can do ENCLU[EMODPE] whether we like it or not, even on old kernels)

So I guess I don't understand the purpose of this patch	or of the rules 
in the later patches, and I feel like this is getting more complicated 
than makes sense.

Could we perhaps make vm_max_prot_bits dynamic or at least controllable 
in some useful way?  My initial proposal (years ago) was for 
vm_max_prot_bits to be *separately* configured at initial load time 
instead of being inferred from secinfo with the intent being that the 
user untrusted runtime would set it appropriately.  I have no problem 
with allowing runtime changes as long as the security policy makes sense 
and it's kept consistent with PTEs.

Also, I think we need a changelog message or, even better, actual docs 
in kernel, explaining the actual final set of rules and invariants for 
all these masks.

--Andy