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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ8NJdCKE7x5qzWoSDZvboyyy+fmOkA-cTN0XrvfYepeA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Dec 2021 11:04:23 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@...il.com>,
David Anderson <dvander@...gle.com>,
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@...roid.com>,
Miklos Szeredi <miklos@...redi.hu>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
John Stultz <john.stultz@...aro.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
overlayfs <linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@...roid.com>, selinux@...r.kernel.org,
paulmoore@...rosoft.com, Luca.Boccassi@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
On Fri, Dec 3, 2021 at 10:38 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 09:36:42AM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 17, 2021 at 3:58 AM David Anderson <dvander@...gle.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Mark Salyzyn (3):
> > > Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
> > > overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
> > > overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
> > >
> > > Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
> > > overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
> > >
> > > The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should
> > > be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
> > >
> > > The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
> > >
> > > By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
> > > recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are
> > > checked against the caller's credentials.
> > >
> > > If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the
> > > mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's
> > > when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a
> > > lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the
> > > generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
> > >
> > > We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all
> > > subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the
> > > caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option
> > > override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature",
> > > existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
>
> BTW, where is patch 1 of the series. I can't seem to find it.
Lore to the rescue ...
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20211117015806.2192263-2-dvander@google.com/
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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