linux-kernel - Re: [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY

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Message-ID: <75aca493-e8d6-ab1e-2aaf-9e9a6b183ed7@linux.ibm.com>
Date:   Fri, 3 Dec 2021 12:39:01 -0500
From:   Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     zohar@...ux.ibm.com, serge@...lyn.com,
        christian.brauner@...ntu.com, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
        dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
        krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
        mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com,
        puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
        Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN


On 12/3/21 11:40, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 12/2/2021 6:31 PM, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Denis Semakin <denis.semakin@...wei.com>
>>
>> This patch introduces CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN, a new capability that allows
>> to setup IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies per container
>> for non-root users.
>>
>> The main purpose of this new capability is discribed in this document:
>> https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/IMA_Namespacing_design_considerations
>> It is said: "setting the policy should be possibly without the powerful
>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN and there should be the opportunity to gate this with a 
>> new
>> capability CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN that allows a user to set the IMA policy
>> during container runtime.."
>>
>> In other words it should be possible to setup IMA policies while not
>> giving too many privilges to the user, therefore splitting the
>> CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN off from CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> Please use CAP_MAC_ADMIN, as discussed on the previous submission.

I wasn't clear on consensus. But sure, let's go with CAP_MAC_ADMIN.

    Stefan