linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 068/106] tty: hvc: replace BUG

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Message-Id: <20211206145557.824018686@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  6 Dec 2021 15:56:16 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 068/106] tty: hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>

commit e679004dec37566f658a255157d3aed9d762a2b7 upstream.

Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707091045.460-1-jgross@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c |   17 ++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
@@ -99,7 +99,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencon
 	cons = intf->out_cons;
 	prod = intf->out_prod;
 	mb();			/* update queue values before going on */
-	BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out));
+
+	if ((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out)) {
+		pr_err_once("xencons: Illegal ring page indices");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	while ((sent < len) && ((prod - cons) < sizeof(intf->out)))
 		intf->out[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(prod++, intf->out)] = data[sent++];
@@ -127,7 +131,10 @@ static int domU_write_console(uint32_t v
 	 */
 	while (len) {
 		int sent = __write_console(cons, data, len);
-		
+
+		if (sent < 0)
+			return sent;
+
 		data += sent;
 		len -= sent;
 
@@ -151,7 +158,11 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vt
 	cons = intf->in_cons;
 	prod = intf->in_prod;
 	mb();			/* get pointers before reading ring */
-	BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in));
+
+	if ((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in)) {
+		pr_err_once("xencons: Illegal ring page indices");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	while (cons != prod && recv < len)
 		buf[recv++] = intf->in[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(cons++, intf->in)];