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Message-Id: <20211207202127.1508689-4-stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 15:21:14 -0500
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@...ux.ibm.com, serge@...lyn.com,
christian.brauner@...ntu.com, containers@...ts.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, ebiederm@...ssion.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@...wei.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
mpeters@...hat.com, lhinds@...hat.com, lsturman@...hat.com,
puiterwi@...hat.com, jejb@...ux.ibm.com, jamjoom@...ibm.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, rgb@...hat.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 03/16] ima: Namespace audit status flags
From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
The iint cache stores whether the file is measured, appraised, audited
etc. This patch moves the IMA_AUDITED flag into the per-namespace
ns_status, enabling IMA audit mechanism to audit the same file each time
it is accessed in a new namespace.
The ns_status is not looked up if the CONFIG_IMA_NS is disabled or if
any of the IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS (currently only IMA_AUDIT) is not
enabled.
Read and write operations on the iint flags is replaced with function
calls. For reading, iint_flags() returns the bitwise AND of iint->flags
and ns_status->flags. The ns_status flags are masked with
IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS (currently only IMA_AUDITED). Similarly
set_iint_flags() only writes the masked portion to the ns_status flags,
while the iint flags is set as before. The ns_status parameter added to
ima_audit_measurement() is used with the above functions to query and
set the ns_status flags.
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog:
v2:
* fixed flag calculation in iint_flags()
---
init/Kconfig | 3 +++
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 27890607e8cb..1e1c49f1d129 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1251,6 +1251,9 @@ config IMA_NS
Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each user namespace.
Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately
in each IMA namespace.
+ Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace,
+ which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed
+ in a new namespace.
endif # NAMESPACES
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 28896d256e36..dd06e16c4e1c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
int pcr, const char *func_data,
bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const unsigned char *filename);
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct ns_status *status);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_template_entry **entry,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
@@ -426,6 +427,9 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS IMA_AUDIT
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS IMA_AUDITED
+
int ima_ns_init(void);
struct ima_namespace;
int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
@@ -436,6 +440,10 @@ struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status);
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags);
#else
static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
@@ -444,6 +452,19 @@ static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
return NULL;
}
+static inline unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status)
+{
+ return iint->flags;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ iint->flags = flags;
+ return flags;
+}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index a64fb0130b01..8f7bab17b784 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -342,14 +342,16 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
}
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- const unsigned char *filename)
+ const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct ns_status *status)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *hash;
const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
int i;
+ unsigned long flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
- if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+ if (flags & IMA_AUDITED)
return;
hash = kzalloc((iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -372,7 +374,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
audit_log_task_info(ab);
audit_log_end(ab);
- iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+ set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | IMA_AUDITED);
out:
kfree(hash);
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 465865412100..4df60dbb56f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+ struct ns_status *status = NULL;
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+ unsigned long flags;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -244,6 +246,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
if (!iint)
rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!rc && (action & IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS)) {
+ status = ima_get_ns_status(get_current_ns(), inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(status))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(status);
+ }
}
if (!rc && violation_check)
@@ -259,11 +267,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
+
if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
/* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
- iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
- IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
- IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
+ flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
+ IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
+ IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
/*
* Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
@@ -274,7 +284,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
!(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
!(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
- iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
@@ -282,9 +292,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
* IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
*/
- iint->flags |= action;
+ flags = set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | action);
action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
- action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+ action &= ~((flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
@@ -359,7 +369,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
&pathname, filename);
}
if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
- ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+ ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname, status);
if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 566e59524958..1fe1d910996b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -75,6 +75,26 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
destroy_ima_ns(ns);
}
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status)
+{
+ if (!status)
+ return iint->flags;
+
+ return (iint->flags & ~IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS) |
+ (status->flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS);
+}
+
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ iint->flags = flags;
+ if (status)
+ status->flags = flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS;
+
+ return flags;
+}
+
static int __init imans_cache_init(void)
{
imans_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(ima_namespace, SLAB_PANIC);
--
2.31.1
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