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Message-ID: <87czm7ehel.fsf@suse.de>
Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 07:32:02 +0100
From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
To: Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@...e.de>,
Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@...wei.com>,
Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@...el.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
qat-linux@...el.com, keyrings@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to dh-generic
Stephan Müller <smueller@...onox.de> writes:
> Am Mittwoch, 1. Dezember 2021, 01:48:50 CET schrieb Nicolai Stange:
>
> Hi Nicolai,
>
>> The support for NVME in-band authentication currently in the works ([1])
>> needs to generate ephemeral DH keys. Make dh-generic's ->set_secret()
>> to generate an ephemeral key via the recently added crypto_dh_gen_privkey()
>> in case the input ->key_size is zero. Note that this behaviour is in
>> analogy to ecdh's ->set_secret().
>>
>> [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211122074727.25988-4-hare@suse.de
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
>> ---
>> crypto/dh.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
>> 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/dh.c b/crypto/dh.c
>> index 131b80064cb1..2e49b114e038 100644
>> --- a/crypto/dh.c
>> +++ b/crypto/dh.c
>> @@ -71,25 +71,41 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const
>> void *buf, {
>> struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm);
>> struct dh params;
>> + char key[CRYPTO_DH_MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE];
>> + int err;
>>
>> /* Free the old MPI key if any */
>> dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
>>
>> - if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0)
>> + err = crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms);
>> + if (err)
>> goto err_clear_ctx;
>>
>> - if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0)
>> + if (!params.key_size) {
>
> As this params data may come from user space, shouldn't we use the same logic
> as in ecdh's set_key function:
>
> if (!params.key || !params.key_size)
crypto_dh_decode_key() always leaves params.key set even for
!params.key_size, so checking for !params.key wouldn't buy anything
here. FWIW, it seems like it's actually the same for
crypto_ecdh_decode_key().
I'd personally prefer to not add the !params.key check, because it would
suggest that there are code paths which can lead to the condition
params.key_size && !params.key. I would find this confusing when reading
the code, but OTOH I don't have strong objections, so if you insist on
adding the !params.key check, I'd be Ok with it.
Thanks,
Nicolai
>
> ?
>
>
>> + err = crypto_dh_gen_privkey(params.group_id, key,
>> + ¶ms.key_size);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto err_clear_ctx;
>> + params.key = key;
>> + }
>> +
>> + err = dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms);
>> + if (err)
>> goto err_clear_ctx;
>>
>> ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size);
>> - if (!ctx->xa)
>> + if (!ctx->xa) {
>> + err = -EINVAL;
>> goto err_clear_ctx;
>> + }
>> +
>> + memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
>>
>> return 0;
>>
>> err_clear_ctx:
>> dh_clear_ctx(ctx);
>> - return -EINVAL;
>> + return err;
>> }
>>
>> /*
>
>
> Ciao
> Stephan
>
>
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