Message-Id: <209a0770c1c9c4645a687c04d8fb5e32e3466bb6.1638962992.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed,  8 Dec 2021 13:37:16 +0200
From:   Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
To:     David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
        Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Cc:     Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@...sta.com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.co.jp>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
        Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
        Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
        Ivan Delalande <colona@...sta.com>,
        Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@...gle.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 01/18] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management

This commit adds support to add and remove keys but does not use them
further.

Similar to tcp md5 a single pointer to a struct tcp_authopt_info* struct
is added to struct tcp_sock, this avoids increasing memory usage. The
data structures related to tcp_authopt are initialized on setsockopt and
only freed on socket close.

Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
---
 include/linux/tcp.h       |   9 ++
 include/net/tcp.h         |   1 +
 include/net/tcp_authopt.h |  76 +++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/tcp.h  |  81 ++++++++++++
 net/ipv4/Kconfig          |  14 ++
 net/ipv4/Makefile         |   1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp.c            |  30 +++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c    | 263 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c       |   2 +
 9 files changed, 477 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/net/tcp_authopt.h
 create mode 100644 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c

diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index 78b91bb92f0d..497604176119 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -140,10 +140,12 @@ struct tcp_request_sock {
 static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req)
 {
 	return (struct tcp_request_sock *)req;
 }
 
+struct tcp_authopt_info;
+
 struct tcp_sock {
 	/* inet_connection_sock has to be the first member of tcp_sock */
 	struct inet_connection_sock	inet_conn;
 	u16	tcp_header_len;	/* Bytes of tcp header to send		*/
 	u16	gso_segs;	/* Max number of segs per GSO packet	*/
@@ -403,10 +405,14 @@ struct tcp_sock {
 
 /* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */
 	struct tcp_md5sig_info	__rcu *md5sig_info;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+	struct tcp_authopt_info	__rcu *authopt_info;
+#endif
+
 /* TCP fastopen related information */
 	struct tcp_fastopen_request *fastopen_req;
 	/* fastopen_rsk points to request_sock that resulted in this big
 	 * socket. Used to retransmit SYNACKs etc.
 	 */
@@ -453,10 +459,13 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock {
 	int			  tw_ts_recent_stamp;
 	u32			  tw_tx_delay;
 #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
 	struct tcp_md5sig_key	  *tw_md5_key;
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+	struct tcp_authopt_info	  *tw_authopt_info;
+#endif
 };
 
 static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk;
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 44e442bf23f9..6cc2eeb45deb 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
 #define TCPOPT_WINDOW		3	/* Window scaling */
 #define TCPOPT_SACK_PERM        4       /* SACK Permitted */
 #define TCPOPT_SACK             5       /* SACK Block */
 #define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP	8	/* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */
 #define TCPOPT_MD5SIG		19	/* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */
+#define TCPOPT_AUTHOPT		29	/* Auth Option (RFC5925) */
 #define TCPOPT_MPTCP		30	/* Multipath TCP (RFC6824) */
 #define TCPOPT_FASTOPEN		34	/* Fast open (RFC7413) */
 #define TCPOPT_EXP		254	/* Experimental */
 /* Magic number to be after the option value for sharing TCP
  * experimental options. See draft-ietf-tcpm-experimental-options-00.txt
diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..42ad764e98c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+#ifndef _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H
+#define _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H
+
+#include <uapi/linux/tcp.h>
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_key_info - Representation of a Master Key Tuple as per RFC5925
+ *
+ * Key structure lifetime is only protected by RCU so readers needs to hold a
+ * single rcu_read_lock until they're done with the key.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_key_info {
+	/** @node: node in &tcp_authopt_info.head list */
+	struct hlist_node node;
+	/** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	/** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+	u32 flags;
+	/** @send_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.send_id */
+	u8 send_id;
+	/** @recv_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.recv_id */
+	u8 recv_id;
+	/** @alg_id: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.alg */
+	u8 alg_id;
+	/** @keylen: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.keylen */
+	u8 keylen;
+	/** @key: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.key */
+	u8 key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
+	/** @addr: Same as &tcp_authopt_key.addr */
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_info - Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt
+ *
+ * This is lazy-initialized in order to avoid increasing memory usage for
+ * regular TCP sockets. Once created it is only destroyed on socket close.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_info {
+	/** @head: List of tcp_authopt_key_info */
+	struct hlist_head head;
+	/** @rcu: for kfree_rcu */
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	/** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+	u32 flags;
+	/** @src_isn: Local Initial Sequence Number */
+	u32 src_isn;
+	/** @dst_isn: Remote Initial Sequence Number */
+	u32 dst_isn;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk);
+int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen);
+int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key);
+int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen);
+#else
+static inline int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+static inline int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *key)
+{
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+static inline void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+static inline int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_AUTHOPT_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
index 8fc09e8638b3..76d7be6b27f4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
@@ -126,10 +126,12 @@ enum {
 #define TCP_INQ			36	/* Notify bytes available to read as a cmsg on read */
 
 #define TCP_CM_INQ		TCP_INQ
 
 #define TCP_TX_DELAY		37	/* delay outgoing packets by XX usec */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT		38	/* TCP Authentication Option (RFC5925) */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY		39	/* TCP Authentication Option Key (RFC5925) */
 
 
 #define TCP_REPAIR_ON		1
 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF		0
 #define TCP_REPAIR_OFF_NO_WP	-1	/* Turn off without window probes */
@@ -340,10 +342,89 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig {
 	__u16	tcpm_keylen;
 	__be32	tcpm_addr[4];
 	__u8	tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN];
 };
 
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags`
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_flag {
+	/**
+	 * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED:
+	 *	Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no
+	 *	key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept
+	 *	such connections.
+	 */
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED = (1 << 2),
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt {
+	/** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */
+	__u32	flags;
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags`
+ *
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL: Delete the key and ignore non-id fields
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS: Exclude TCP options from signature
+ * @TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND: Key only valid for `tcp_authopt.addr`
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_key_flag {
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL = (1 << 0),
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS = (1 << 1),
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND = (1 << 2),
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum tcp_authopt_alg - Algorithms for TCP Authentication Option
+ */
+enum tcp_authopt_alg {
+	/** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96: HMAC-SHA-1-96 as described in RFC5926 */
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_HMAC_SHA_1_96 = 1,
+	/** @TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96: AES-128-CMAC-96 as described in RFC5926 */
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_ALG_AES_128_CMAC_96 = 2,
+};
+
+/* for TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY socket option */
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN	80
+
+/**
+ * struct tcp_authopt_key - TCP Authentication KEY
+ *
+ * Key are identified by the combination of:
+ * - send_id
+ * - recv_id
+ * - addr (iff TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+ *
+ * RFC5925 requires that key ids must not overlap for the same TCP connection.
+ * This is not enforced by linux.
+ */
+struct tcp_authopt_key {
+	/** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_key_flag */
+	__u32	flags;
+	/** @send_id: keyid value for send */
+	__u8	send_id;
+	/** @recv_id: keyid value for receive */
+	__u8	recv_id;
+	/** @alg: One of &enum tcp_authopt_alg */
+	__u8	alg;
+	/** @keylen: Length of the key buffer */
+	__u8	keylen;
+	/** @key: Secret key */
+	__u8	key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN];
+	/**
+	 * @addr: Key is only valid for this address
+	 *
+	 * Ignored unless TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND flag is set
+	 */
+	struct __kernel_sockaddr_storage addr;
+};
+
 /* setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) */
 
 #define TCP_RECEIVE_ZEROCOPY_FLAG_TLB_CLEAN_HINT 0x1
 struct tcp_zerocopy_receive {
 	__u64 address;		/* in: address of mapping */
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
index 87983e70f03f..6459f4ea6f1d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
+++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
@@ -740,5 +740,19 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG
 	  RFC2385 specifies a method of giving MD5 protection to TCP sessions.
 	  Its main (only?) use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers
 	  on the Internet.
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config TCP_AUTHOPT
+	bool "TCP: Authentication Option support (RFC5925)"
+	select CRYPTO
+	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HMAC
+	select CRYPTO_AES
+	select CRYPTO_CMAC
+	help
+	  RFC5925 specifies a new method of giving protection to TCP sessions.
+	  Its intended use is to protect BGP sessions between core routers
+	  on the Internet. It obsoletes TCP MD5 (RFC2385) but is incompatible.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
diff --git a/net/ipv4/Makefile b/net/ipv4/Makefile
index bbdd9c44f14e..d336f32ce177 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/Makefile
+++ b/net/ipv4/Makefile
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV) += tcp_nv.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO) += tcp_veno.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE) += tcp_scalable.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP) += tcp_lp.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH) += tcp_yeah.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS) += tcp_illinois.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT) += tcp_authopt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += tcp_bpf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += udp_bpf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += cipso_ipv4.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM) += xfrm4_policy.o xfrm4_state.o xfrm4_input.o \
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 20054618c87e..022811dd705d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -270,10 +270,11 @@
 
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
 #include <net/mptcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -3602,10 +3603,16 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
 	case TCP_MD5SIG:
 	case TCP_MD5SIG_EXT:
 		err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
 		break;
 #endif
+	case TCP_AUTHOPT:
+		err = tcp_set_authopt(sk, optval, optlen);
+		break;
+	case TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY:
+		err = tcp_set_authopt_key(sk, optval, optlen);
+		break;
 	case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT:
 		/* Cap the max time in ms TCP will retry or probe the window
 		 * before giving up and aborting (ETIMEDOUT) a connection.
 		 */
 		if (val < 0)
@@ -4251,10 +4258,33 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
 		if (!err && copy_to_user(optval, &zc, len))
 			err = -EFAULT;
 		return err;
 	}
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AUTHOPT
+	case TCP_AUTHOPT: {
+		struct tcp_authopt info;
+		int err;
+
+		if (get_user(len, optlen))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		lock_sock(sk);
+		err = tcp_get_authopt_val(sk, &info);
+		release_sock(sk);
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(info));
+		if (put_user(len, optlen))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_to_user(optval, &info, len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	default:
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 	}
 
 	if (put_user(len, optlen))
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e6740ef29a84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+
+/* checks that ipv4 or ipv6 addr matches. */
+static bool ipvx_addr_match(struct sockaddr_storage *a1,
+			    struct sockaddr_storage *a2)
+{
+	if (a1->ss_family != a2->ss_family)
+		return false;
+	if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET &&
+	    (((struct sockaddr_in *)a1)->sin_addr.s_addr !=
+	     ((struct sockaddr_in *)a2)->sin_addr.s_addr))
+		return false;
+	if (a1->ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+	    !ipv6_addr_equal(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a1)->sin6_addr,
+			     &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)a2)->sin6_addr))
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *info,
+					struct tcp_authopt_key *key)
+{
+	if (info->send_id != key->send_id)
+		return false;
+	if (info->recv_id != key->recv_id)
+		return false;
+	if ((info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) != (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND))
+		return false;
+	if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+		if (!ipvx_addr_match(&info->addr, &key->addr))
+			return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(const struct sock *sk,
+								 struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+								 struct tcp_authopt_key *ukey)
+{
+	struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key_info, &info->head, node, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk))
+		if (tcp_authopt_key_match_exact(key_info, ukey))
+			return key_info;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+	struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+	info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+	if (info)
+		return info;
+
+	info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!info)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	sk_gso_disable(sk);
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&info->head);
+	rcu_assign_pointer(tp->authopt_info, info);
+
+	return info;
+}
+
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED)
+
+/* Like copy_from_sockopt except tolerate different optlen for compatibility reasons
+ *
+ * If the src is shorter then it's from an old userspace and the rest of dst is
+ * filled with zeros.
+ *
+ * If the dst is shorter then src is from a newer userspace and we only accept
+ * if the rest of the option is all zeros.
+ *
+ * This allows sockopts to grow as long as for new fields zeros has no effect.
+ */
+static int _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant(u8 *dst,
+				       unsigned int dstlen,
+				       sockptr_t src,
+				       unsigned int srclen)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/* If userspace optlen is too short fill the rest with zeros */
+	if (srclen > dstlen) {
+		if (sockptr_is_kernel(src))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		err = check_zeroed_user(src.user + dstlen, srclen - dstlen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+		if (err == 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	err = copy_from_sockptr(dst, src, min(srclen, dstlen));
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	if (srclen < dstlen)
+		memset(dst + srclen, 0, dstlen - srclen);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+	struct tcp_authopt opt;
+	struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+	int err;
+
+	sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+	err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(info))
+		return PTR_ERR(info);
+
+	info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt)
+{
+	struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+	struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+	sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+	memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
+	info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+	if (!info)
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Free key nicely, for living sockets */
+static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct sock *sk,
+				struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+				struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key)
+{
+	sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+	hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
+	atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+	kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+}
+
+/* Free info and keys.
+ * Don't touch tp->authopt_info, it might not even be assigned yes.
+ */
+void tcp_authopt_free(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *n;
+	struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &info->head, node) {
+		/* sk is NULL for timewait case
+		 * struct timewait_sock doesn't track sk_omem_alloc
+		 */
+		if (sk)
+			atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
+		hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
+		kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
+	}
+	kfree_rcu(info, rcu);
+}
+
+/* free everything and clear tcp_sock.authopt_info to NULL */
+void tcp_authopt_clear(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+
+	info = rcu_dereference_protected(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+	if (info) {
+		tcp_authopt_free(sk, info);
+		tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+#define TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS ( \
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL | \
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS | \
+	TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND)
+
+int tcp_set_authopt_key(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen)
+{
+	struct tcp_authopt_key opt;
+	struct tcp_authopt_info *info;
+	struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key_info, *old_key_info;
+	int err;
+
+	sock_owned_by_me(sk);
+
+	err = _copy_from_sockptr_tolerant((u8 *)&opt, sizeof(opt), optval, optlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (opt.flags & ~TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (opt.keylen > TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXKEYLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Delete is a special case: */
+	if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_DEL) {
+		info = rcu_dereference_check(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk));
+		if (!info)
+			return -ENOENT;
+		key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, info, &opt);
+		if (!key_info)
+			return -ENOENT;
+		tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, key_info);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* check key family */
+	if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) {
+		if (sk->sk_family != opt.addr.ss_family)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize tcp_authopt_info if not already set */
+	info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk);
+	if (IS_ERR(info))
+		return PTR_ERR(info);
+
+	key_info = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key_info), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+	if (!key_info)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	/* If an old key exists with exact ID then remove and replace.
+	 * RCU-protected readers might observe both and pick any.
+	 */
+	old_key_info = tcp_authopt_key_lookup_exact(sk, info, &opt);
+	if (old_key_info)
+		tcp_authopt_key_del(sk, info, old_key_info);
+	key_info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_KNOWN_FLAGS;
+	key_info->send_id = opt.send_id;
+	key_info->recv_id = opt.recv_id;
+	key_info->alg_id = opt.alg;
+	key_info->keylen = opt.keylen;
+	memcpy(key_info->key, opt.key, opt.keylen);
+	memcpy(&key_info->addr, &opt.addr, sizeof(key_info->addr));
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&key_info->node, &info->head);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 3dd19a2bf06c..0aa5122b29e0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@
 
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/icmp.h>
 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>
+#include <net/tcp_authopt.h>
 #include <net/transp_v6.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
 #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
@@ -2276,10 +2277,11 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
 		tcp_clear_md5_list(sk);
 		kfree_rcu(rcu_dereference_protected(tp->md5sig_info, 1), rcu);
 		tp->md5sig_info = NULL;
 	}
 #endif
+	tcp_authopt_clear(sk);
 
 	/* Clean up a referenced TCP bind bucket. */
 	if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash)
 		inet_put_port(sk);
 
-- 
2.25.1

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