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Message-ID: <CALMp9eSLU1kfffC3Du58L8iPY6LmKyVO0yU7c3wEnJAD9JZw4w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 19:48:27 -0800
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Like Xu <like.xu.linux@...il.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86/svm: Add module param to control PMU virtualization
On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 6:15 PM Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> On 12/10/21 20:25, Jim Mattson wrote:
> > In the long run, I'd like to be able to override this system-wide
> > setting on a per-VM basis, for VMs that I trust. (Of course, this
> > implies that I trust the userspace process as well.)
> >
> > How would you feel if we were to add a kvm ioctl to override this
> > setting, for a particular VM, guarded by an appropriate permissions
> > check, like capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) or capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)?
>
> What's the rationale for guarding this with a capability check? IIRC
> you don't have such checks for perf_event_open (apart for getting kernel
> addresses, which is not a problem for virtualization).
My reasoning was simply that for userspace to override a mode 0444
kernel module parameter, it should have the rights to reload the
module with the parameter override. I wasn't thinking specifically
about PMU capabilities.
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