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Message-ID: <CALzav=eFgjTV_4f_RfG9xA3DUy3n=TDth86AHX1XmYC6CAaj=w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 13 Dec 2021 13:25:18 -0800
From:   David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>
To:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        laijs@...ux.alibaba.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Revert "KVM: VMX: Save HOST_CR3 in vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest()"

On Fri, Dec 10, 2021 at 4:12 PM Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> This reverts commit 15ad9762d69fd8e40a4a51828c1d6b0c1b8fbea0.
>
> David Matlack reports:
>
> "While testing some patches I ran into a VM_BUG_ON that I have been able to
> reproduce at kvm/queue commit 45af1bb99b72 ("KVM: VMX: Clean up PI
> pre/post-block WARNs").
>
> To repro run the kvm-unit-tests on a kernel built from kvm/queue with
> CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y. I was testing on an Intel Cascade Lake host and have not
> tested in any other environments yet. The repro is not 100% reliable, although
> it's fairly easy to trigger and always during a vmx* kvm-unit-tests
>
> Given the details of the crash, commit 15ad9762d69f ("KVM: VMX: Save HOST_CR3
> in vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest()") and surrounding commits look most suspect."
>
> Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>

I have not been able to reproduce the VM_BUG_ON with this revert.

Tested-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@...gle.com>

> ---
>         Not tested yet.  I did reproduce the WARN with debug kernels though.
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c |  8 +++++++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 17 +++++++----------
>  2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> index 2f6f465e575f..26b236187850 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
> @@ -3054,7 +3054,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> -       unsigned long cr4;
> +       unsigned long cr3, cr4;
>         bool vm_fail;
>
>         if (!nested_early_check)
> @@ -3077,6 +3077,12 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>          */
>         vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0);
>
> +       cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
> +       if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
> +               vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
> +               vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
> +       }
> +
>         cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
>         if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
>                 vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 640f4719612c..7826556b2a47 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -1103,7 +1103,6 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>         int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
>  #endif
> -       unsigned long cr3;
>         unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
>         u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
>         int i;
> @@ -1168,14 +1167,6 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  #endif
>
>         vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
> -
> -       /* Host CR3 including its PCID is stable when guest state is loaded. */
> -       cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
> -       if (unlikely(cr3 != host_state->cr3)) {
> -               vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
> -               host_state->cr3 = cr3;
> -       }
> -
>         vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
>  }
>
> @@ -6638,7 +6629,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>         struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> -       unsigned long cr4;
> +       unsigned long cr3, cr4;
>
>         /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
>         if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
> @@ -6683,6 +6674,12 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>                 vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
>         vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
>
> +       cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
> +       if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
> +               vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
> +               vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
> +       }
> +
>         cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
>         if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
>                 vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
> --
> 2.31.1
>

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