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Message-Id: <20211213042215.3096-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2021 12:22:12 +0800
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@...il.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: x86@...nel.org, Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] x86/entry: Fix 3 suspicious bugs
From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@...ux.alibaba.com>
The problems described in patch1/patch2 can only happen when the system
owner is really paranoid.
For patch3, I hardly believe #VC can hit in the code range returining
to user without implementing more SEV features.
Lai Jiangshan (3):
X86/db: Change __this_cpu_read() to this_cpu_read() in
hw_breakpoint_active()
x86/hw_breakpoint: Add stack_canary to hw_breakpoints denylist
x86/sev: The code for returning to user space is also in syscall gap
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c | 8 ++++++++
6 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.19.1.6.gb485710b
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